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    In order to meet the challenges brought by the economic reform and social 
transformation since 1978, local government at various levels in China is taking a series 
of measures to reinvent its government, such as transforming government functions, 
introducing the cadre responsibility system to improve the accountability of leaders and 
so forth.  
    Over the past twenty years, studies on the Chinese politics mainly focus on 
government reform and some certain rural issues, including how to deal with the 
relationship between the local government and central government, how to reduce the 
excessive peasants’ tax burdens, promote the development of rural society and the 
democratic election of the village leaders and village committee. Although research on 
the effectiveness of local government in democratic countries has achieved great process, 
this topic is still new for most scholars engaged in conducting research on Chinese 
politics. There is still no satisfactory answer to the question: How effective is the local 
government after the reform?” 
    Considering the multi-level nature of Chinese bureaucracy, this study will focus on the 
effectiveness of local government at the district level. Is the district government effective 
after reform? What might contribute to the effectiveness of the district government? Are 
there valuable and feasible policies that can improve the effectiveness of local district 
government in China? These are the research questions I attempt to explore in this study. 
    Therefore, I choose the two District Governments of Jintai and Weibin in Baoji City of 
Shaanxi Province to do my case study. After reviewing government functions and the 
official system for assessing government effectiveness in Baoji City, I constructed fifteen 
 iv
indicators to evaluate the effectiveness of these two district governments in terms of their 
ability to perform functions.  
    My research results show that Weibin District Government was more effective than the 
Jintai District Government from 1998-2002. When I attempt to explain why those two 
districts had different levels of government effectiveness, the conventional idea that local 
economic condition will contribute to government effectiveness cannot be justified in my 
case study. The research findings also demonstrate that there is no causal relationship 
between education, urbanization or sociocultural factors and government effectiveness. 
Finally, I propose five policy suggestions for improving the effectiveness of the Jintai and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The Research Problem 
Research Questions 
Since China introduced the economic reform and open-door policy in 1978, Chinese 
governments at various levels face tremendous challenges. Rampant official corruption is 
a good example. A large number of laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises and the 
excessive farmer’s tax burdens have triggered large-scale protests against the government 
in China. Furthermore, the deprivation of environment and resources seriously influenced 
the sustainable development of the society. All these problems constitute considerable 
challenges to the stability of the society and the governance of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). 
    Therefore, China has taken a series of measures to reinvent its government to adapt to 
the new environment, such as transforming government functions, streamlining the 
relationship between government and society and introducing a cadre responsibility 
system to improve the leaders’ accountability and government performance. 
    During the past twenty years, a number of scholars in China and other countries have 
done research on government reform in China and proposed many suggestions, such as 
the adjustment of fiscal revenue distribution between the central and local government, 
improvement of urban-rural income disparity and combating corruption within the 
government. Indeed, “excessive peasants’ tax burdens have addressed the highest policy 
attention and academic curiosity.”1  
                                                 
1 Justin Yifu Lin, Ran Tao, and Mingxing Liu, “Decentralization and Local Governance in the Context 
of China’s Transition,” (accessed on 23 September 2004), available from: 
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wkgb.asp; 
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    In contrast, rigorous appraisal of government effectiveness is rare, even though “good 
and efficient government” is at the top of the agenda. There is still no satisfactory answer 
to the question “how effective is the government after the reform?” From the perspective 
of public administration, I attempt to evaluate government effectiveness during the 
reform era in China, to explore some possible factors related to government effectiveness, 
and then put forward suggestions for improving government effectiveness.  
    However, this research does not present the whole story of government effectiveness in 
contemporary China, given the relatively limited research resources and the length of the 
thesis. Considering the multi-level nature of Chinese bureaucracy, this study will focus 
on government effectiveness at the local level, i.e. the district level.2 Is there any existing 
system for evaluating the effectiveness of the district government in China? If this system 
exists, what are its strengths and weaknesses? In addition, how can I construct indicators 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the district government? Is the district government 
effective after reform on the basis of my research results? What might contribute to the 
effectiveness of the district government? Are there valuable and feasible policies that can 
improve the effectiveness of local district government in China? These are the research 
questions I will explore in this study. 
Significance of Study 
Evaluating the effectiveness of Chinese local government is a new topic for many 
scholars engaging in public administration research. Their research interests before 
mainly focus on government reform, local tax reform, the relationship between the 
                                                 
2  Under the central government, in China there is a four-level administrative network of provinces, 
cities/municipalities, counties/districts and townships/towns. The multi-level nature of Chinese bureaucracy 
frequently causes confusion when people talk about local governance in China, since the level of 
decentralization and local governance they talk about can range from provincial to township level.  
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central and local government, government and society and other related topics.3 There 
are two important limitations of the existing research. Firstly, in the Chinese context, the 
definition of “government effectiveness” is obscure and unclear as it is confused with 
definition of “government performance”. 4  Under this circumstance, this leads to an 
inaccurate measurement of government effectiveness in some certain cases. It is because 
performance is a total concept, including all kinds of aspects. Government effectiveness 
is only an important component of government performance. However, any indicator for 
evaluating government effectiveness can be treated as one of indicators for evaluating 
government performance, but any performance indicator cannot be simply regarded as an 
effectiveness indicator. 
    Secondly, research on the evaluation of government effectiveness in China is at a 
nascent stage, which falls into the phase of applying Western theory for explaining 
Chinese phenomenon. Given the ideas about “new public management” and “evaluation 
of government effectiveness” are introduced and developed in the recent decade, most 
policy makers and academic researchers only discuss this issue in theory and their 
research findings also cannot be empirically tested. Research on government 
effectiveness in China is lagging behind, compared with the existing research on 
government effectiveness in Western countries. Given this background, a case study and 
in-depth analysis on the effectiveness of several individual governments currently 
                                                 
3 The literature in this regard is too numerous to list here. Examples include Peter T.Y. Cheung, Jae Ho 
Chung and Zhimin Lin, (eds.) Provincial Strategies of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China (Armonk: 
M.E.Sharpe, 1998); David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, (eds.) China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and 
Regionalism (London: Routledge, 1994); Jia Hao and Li Zhimin, (eds.) Changing Central-Local Relations 
In China: Reform and State Capacity (Boulder : Westview Press, 1994); Kennethal Lieberthal, Governing 
China : From revolution through reform, 2nd ed (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004) and Jean C. Oi, “Two 
Decades of Rural Reform in China: An Overview and Assessment,” The China Quarterly, No. 159 
(September, 1999), pp. 616-628. 
4 For details on this point, please refer to pp. 18-19. 
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becomes necessary and crucial for future research.5 Moreover, due to China’s huge size 
and diversity, the case study approach has important significance and value as it might be 
more applicable and feasible. But this case study approach also has its own limitations, 
namely the inability to generalize from my study in Baoji.  
    In this way, this thesis will provide a brief introduction on Chinese local government 
and its structure and functions. It will also extensively discuss the effectiveness of the 
district government. My research is preliminary, but it suggests some directions for the 
future study on the effectiveness of local governments at district level in China. 
    My study will also provide some useful information for local governance in China. 
Chinese governments have initiated measures to improve their work. These measures 
cover a broad area, which includes the introduction of advanced management methods 
adapted from private organizations and Western countries, such as performance 
management and audit system, and the application of customer-orientated services in the 
management of the public sector. Efficient and effective governments are expected to 
emerge in China in order to serve the people better, as well as to maintain the CCP’s 
ruling power. In this sense, research on government effectiveness has practical 
significance. The research findings and policy suggestions in this study would be helpful 
for Chinese governments to improve their effectiveness and performance. Furthermore, 
they would have a better understanding of the relationship between the socioeconomic, 
sociocultural and other factors and government effectiveness in China.  
                                                 
5 One question may be raised up here: as China is a communist country, is it appropriate to apply Western 
theory to explain Chinese phenomenon? We all know China now is underway to a market economy, the 
current functions of local government are also to provide public service to local people like the ones in 
Western countries. Since I am supposed to evaluate the government effectiveness in terms of its ability to 
perform functions, western theory can be applied into Chinese practice in this study. Of course, evaluation 
indicators will be also constructed based on Chinese specific situation, not following western theory too 
literally.  
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Local Government in China 
Local Government 
Based on the UK experience, local government is defined by John Kingdom as “the self-
government of subnational territorial units of the state.”6 The origins of local government 
structure as we all know them today can be traced to 11th century Europe or even earlier. 
But “the institutions which gave a recognized status to local government in the early 
Middle Ages in Europe were Teutonic or Germanic: burg, borough, and the French bourg 
from the root meaning ‘protect’ or ‘hide’.” 7  Town, borough and city all originally 
denoted fortified enclosures into which the local population could retreat when under 
external threat. Local authorities thus became the basic element in national systems of 
government, able to appeal to the courts for their defence if state action conflicted with 
their constitutional status.8
    Local government or as in India it is referred to, local self-government, is essentially a 
form of decentralization. 9  “Conceptually, it is a multi-dimensional, including social, 
economic, geographic, legal, political and administrative dimensions.”10  The political 
facets of local government present the most distinct dimension of its concept, which is 
different from government and various other forms of public agencies. In political terms, 
local government is concerned with the governance of a specific local area constituting a 
                                                 
6 John Kingdom, Government and Politics in Britain: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (London: Polity Press, 
1999), p. 570. 
7 Alan Norton, International Handbook of Local and Regional Government: A Comparative Analysis of 
Advanced Democracies (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1994), p.3. 
8 Ibid., p.3 and see also John J. Gargan, ed., Handbook of Local Government Administration (New York: 
Marcel Dekker, 1997). 
9 M.A. Muttalib, “Decentralization: Local Self Government Institutions and Resource Mobilization: The 
Indian Experience”, in M.A. Muttalib and M.A. Ali Khan, (eds.) Theory of Local Government (New 
Delhi:Sterling Publishers, 1982), pp.172-173. 
10 M.A. Muttalib and M.A. Ali Khan, (eds.) Theory of Local Government (New Delhi:Sterling Publishers, 
1982), pp.1-3. 
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political sub-division of a nation, state or other political unit, in other words, acting as 
one component part of the political mechanism for governance of a country.11 Under the 
Philippine 1973 Constitution, the criteria used in the creation of the local governments 
were: (1) population; (2) average estimated annual income for the last three years; (3) 
land area; and (4) approval of the majority of the votes cast in plebiscite.12  
    Hasnat Abdul Rye claimed that “local government, conceptually, is also multi-
dimensional. It is basically an organized social entity with a feeling of oneness.” 13  
Norman Uphoff proposed that “the local governments are elected bodies such as village 
councils or panchayats, having authority to deal with development and regulatory tasks, 
accountable to local residents, in contrast to local administration.”14  
    From the above, we can conclude that local government has been widely regarded as a 
form of decentralization, and a unit which has the power granted by the local people to 
manage local affairs. Additionally, local government is emphasized as an integral part of 
social system which has grown under the impact of history, culture, polity, economy, and 
geography of its country by some researchers. More importantly, local government is 
treated as one component of democracy based on Western democratic theories. The 
existence of active sub-national governments with the power to run their own affairs is 
viewed as an important means of maintaining democracy, checking state power and in 
sharp contrast to the centralization of authority seen in autocratic states.  
                                                 
11. Muttalib, “Decentralization: Local Self Government Institutions and Resource Mobilization: The Indian 
Experience”, pp.172-173. 
12 Raul P. de Guzman and Perfecto L. Padilla, “Decentralization, Local Government Institutions and 
Resource Mobilization – the Philippines Experience,” in Muttalib and Khan, (eds.) Theory of Local 
Government, p.141. 
13 Hasnat Abdul Rye, ed., Decentralization, Local Government Institutions and Resource Mobilization 
(Comilla, Bangladesh: Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, 1985), p.2. 
14 Norman Uphoff, “Local Institutions and Decentralization for Development,” in Muttalib and Khan, (eds.) 
Theory of Local Government, p. 49. 
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Local Government in China 
The founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 marked a new era of the 
Chinese history. Like other communist states, China became a one party state which all 
levels of government officials were nominated and appointed from above by the ruling 
CCP. Since the power of local government in China directly derives from the central 
government and local officials are also nominated by their high levels, in reality, local 
governments and their leaders are held responsible more to upper level governments (and 
the CCP) rather than to people in their localities.  
    According to Article 105 in the Constitution of the PRC (amended in 1982), local 
people's governments at various levels in China are the executive bodies of local organs 
of state power as well as the local organs of state administration at the corresponding 
levels. “Governors, mayors and heads of counties, districts, townships and towns assume 
overall responsibility for local people's governments at various levels.”15 Additionally, 
Article 55 in the Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's 
Governments of the PRC (amended in 1995) prescribes that the local people’s 
governments at various levels throughout the country shall be state administrative organs 
under the unified leadership of the State Council and shall be subordinate to it. Therefore, 
based on the Constitution and other related laws, in China, local government or non-
central government, is only an administrative department in local areas, not including 
local legislative and judicial departments.  
    Until December 31, 2002, there are altogether 34 local governments at the provincial 
level,  23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions dominated by the minorities, 4 municipalities 
directly under the Central Government (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) and 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
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two Special Administrative Regions (Hong King and Macao). 16  Under the central 
government in Beijing, there is a four-level administrative network of provinces and 
equivalents, prefectures or municipalities (cities), counties (also urban districts in large 
and medium-sized cities), and townships (towns). 17  Based on official data from the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC, below the central government there are altogether 
34 provincial level units, 332 prefecture or city level units, 2,860 counties and 44,821 
townships at the end of 2002.18   
    Regarding the functions of local government in China, Article 59 in the Organic Law 
of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments of the PRC (amended 
in 1995) also stipulated clearly as follows: 
1) to implement the resolutions of the people's congress and its standing committee at the 
corresponding level as well as decisions and orders of state administrative organs at higher 
levels, to formulate administrative measures and to issue decisions and orders;  
2) to direct the work of its subordinate departments and of the people's governments at lower 
levels;  
3) to alter or annul inappropriate orders and directives of its subordinate departments and 
inappropriate decisions and orders of the people's governments at lower levels;  
4) to appoint or remove personnel in state administrative organs, train them, appraise their 
performance and award or punish them according to the provisions of the law;  
5) to implement the plan for national economic and social development and the budget, and 
conduct administrative work concerning the economy, education, science, culture, public 
health, physical culture, protection of the environment and natural resources, urban and rural 
development, finance, civil affairs, public security, nationality affairs, judicial administration, 
supervision and family planning within its administrative area;  
                                                 
16 Here, provincial governments in China also include Taiwan.  
17 For details on the structure of local government in China, see Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of 
China (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 141-142.  
18 “Zhonghua remin gongheguo xingzheng quhua tongjibiao,” (Statistics of Administrative Divisions of the 
PRC,) Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC (accessed on 19 October 2004), translated from Chinese into 
English, available from: http://www.xzqh.org.cn/yange/2002/tj.htm. 
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6) to protect the socialist property owned by the whole people, property owned collectively by 
working people and citizens' legitimate private property and to maintain public order and 
safeguard citizens' rights of the person and their democratic and other rights; 
7) to protect the legitimate rights and interests of various economic organizations;  
8) to safeguard the rights of minority nationalities and respect their folkways and customs, assist 
those areas where minority nationalities live in concentrated communities within its sphere of 
jurisdiction to exercise regional autonomy in accordance with the Constitution and the law 
and assist the various minority nationalities in their political economic and cultural 
development;  
9) to safeguard women's rights as endowed by the Constitution and the law, such as equality 
with men, equal pay for equal work and freedom of marriage; and  
10) to handle other matters assigned by state administrative organs at higher levels.19 
 
    From the above, it can be concluded the major task of Chinese local government is to 
implement policies from the upper levels, conduct local administrative works to manage 
society. Their activities almost cover all the aspects of people’s daily life.  
    Local government in China differs from local governments in Western democratic 
countries in many aspects. First of all, from the perspective of legal status, in Western 
countries local government possesses legal status in the constitution of countries and can 
exist independently and protect itself from invasion from national power. On the contrary, 
the power of local government in China directly derives from the central government in 
Beijing which means the local government is the creature of central government. If 
necessary and possible, central government can change or dismiss local government at 
will.  
    From the structural perspective, in Western countries, based on different situations and 
needs, different local governments have flexible institutional arrangements and policy 
priorities. Local officials are elected by local people and then assume responsibility for 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
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local people. But, China has a centralized political system with the CCP as the single 
ruling party. Although the laws prescribe that local governments are subject to local 
people’s congress which produces them, in reality local governments are held responsible          
more to upper level governments (and the CCP) than to local people as their leaders are 
appointed and evaluated from above by the higher levels.20 Furthermore, another feature 
particular to the Chinese bureaucratic system is every central ministry or unit should have 
subordinate units at each level of administration. In other words, on the basis of 
department arrangement of the central government, similar counterparts are established to 
perform the same functions in local regions. Because of the continued predominance of 
the fundamental principle of democratic centralism (minzhu jizhongzhi), which is at the 
base of China's State Constitution, “these lower levels are always vulnerable to changes 
in direction and decisions originated at the central level of government.”21 In this sense, 
all local organs are essentially extensions of central government authorities and thus are 
responsible to the "unified leadership" of the central organs.22
    Finally, from the functional perspective, the aim of local government itself in Western 
countries is to provide basic public services in local regions independently. It has its own 
taxation and budget, and delivers fundamental services to local people, such as education, 
entertainment, environment, housing and traffic, and so on. However, in China, due to 
                                                 
20 Justin Yifu Lin, Ran Tao, and Mingxing Liu, “Decentralization and Local Governance in the Context of 
China’s Transition,” (accessed on 23 September 2004), available from: http://www.usc.cuhk.hk/wkgb.asp.  
21 Democratic centralism is a system through which the people influence the policies of the government and 
party members influence the policies of the party; while the government and party maintain centralized 
administrative power to carry out the policies demanded by their constituents. Within both representative 
and executive organizations, the minority must abide by the decisions of the majority, and lower bodies 
must obey the orders of the higher level organizations. The concept, derived from the organizing principles 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was called for as early as 1928 by Mao Zedong. (accessed on 
27 July 27, 2005), available from: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/china/cn_glos.html. 
22 “Local Administration,” (accessed on 19 October 2004), available from:  
http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/china/china297.html. 
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limited fiscal revenue and unclear identification on government functions between levels 
of government, the local government, especially below the provincial level always shares 
responsibilities with other levels of government in many functional areas, such as land 
management and environmental protection.  
 
Effectiveness of Local Government 
Effectiveness 
For this thesis, “effectiveness” is defined as the degree of goal achievement. It is the 
degree to which one organization realizes its goals, and it is appraised in accordance with 
the extent to which the output of an organization has fulfilled the desired goal(s) and 
objective(s). 23  It is result-oriented. Progress can be made towards measuring 
effectiveness only in those areas where there is an agreement on what a desired goal or 
outcome is. However, the objectives of services may vary among different stakeholders. 
Different people from various perspectives may have diverse ideas about what the 
organization exists for, namely what its missions are. As Peter Jackson says: 
Because different stakeholders have different interests in the performance of public sector   
departments, the stakeholder approach helps to force the question ‘whose value for 
money is being considered?’ Value for money will mean different things for different 
individuals. Often these different perspectives will come into conflict and will need to be 
                                                 
23 Researchers listed here all defined “effectiveness” in goal approach, for the details, see Amitai Etzioni, 
Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 6; C. Y. Wu, “Defining Concepts of 
Performance in Development Effectiveness, Profitability and Productivity,” Philippine Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol.17, No. 3 (1973), p. 295; Robert C. Fried, Performance in American Bureaucracy 
(Boston: Little, Brown and company, 1976), p. 55; James L. Mercer and Edwin H. Koester, Public 
Management System (New York : AMACOM, 1978), p. 51; Ralph C. Bledsoe, “Effectiveness and 
Productivity in Public Organizations,” in Handbook of Organization Management, ed. William B. Eddy 
(New York : M. Dekker, 1983), p. 228; Jon S.T. Quah, “Improving the Efficiency and Productivity of the 
Singapore Civil Service,” in Asian Civil Service Systems: Improving Efficiency and Productivity, ed. John P. 
Burns (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1994), p. 154; Paul D. Epstein, Using Performance 
Measurement in Local Government: A Guide to Improving Decisions, Performance, and Accountability 
(New York, N.Y.: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1984), p. 11; Les Metcalfe and Sue Richards, Improving Public 
Management (London: Sage Publications, 1987), pp. 28-30; Norman Flynn, Public Sector Management, 
3rd ed. (New York: Prentice Hall, 1996), pp. 176-178. 
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    Usually organizations have many goals, such as official and operative ones. More 
importantly, these goals may change over time and transform several times in the process 
as they are in direct or indirect interaction with the environment and internal changes. 
Hence, “what does the organization exist to do?” may have changing answers.25 The first 
task to assess the effectiveness of the organization is admittedly to reach an agreement on 
the purpose of the organization.  
    Efficiency, economy and performance, as other indicators to measure the activities of 
organizations, have different meanings with effectiveness. Taking efficiency first, “the 
generic definition is the ratio between outputs and inputs.”26 It is doing the job at the 
lowest cost or cost-oriented, compared with effectiveness, which is result-oriented. 
“Improvement in efficiency may be achieved by increasing outputs relative to inputs, 
reducing inputs relative to outputs or, ideally, doing both at the same time.”27 In their 
study of municipal government performance, Ridley and Simon defined efficiency as: 
“the efficiency of administration is measured by the ratio of the effects actually obtained 
with the available resources to the maximum effects possible with the available 
resources.” 28  
                                                 
24 Flynn, Public Sector Management, p. 178. 
25 Ibid., p. 178. 
26 Metcalfe and Richards, Improving Public Management, p.30. 
27 Ibid., p.30. 
28 Clarence E. Ridley and Herbert A. Simon, Measuring Municipal Activities: The Survey of Suggested 
Criteria for Appraising Administration (Chicago: International City Managers’ Association, 1943), p.2. 
The first edition of this book, published in 1938, was drawn from monthly articles serialized in Public 
Management, The ICMA magazine. 
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    Within this framework, “greater economy is achieved by making savings in actual 
resource inputs relative to planned resource inputs”. 29  At its simplest, measuring 
economy looks at how much money was used up and how money is spent by the 
organization over a period. Figure 1.1 illustrates the distinction between these three 
definitions above. 
Figure 1.1 Distinction between Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness 
 
                    INPUTS                                                                       OUTPUTS 
                   ACTUAL                                                                       ACTUAL 
                      
                                                     
                                                      EFFICIENCY 
    ECONOMY                                                                                             EFFECTIVENESS 
 
 
                  
                  PLANNED                                                                    PLANNED 
 
Source: Les Metcalfe and Sue Richards, Improving Public Management, (London: Sage Publications, 
1987), p. 29.  
 
 
    Performance, it is a key research problem of the public administration and it is a 
primary criterion for judging public organizations and systems. Performance is a total 
concept, including all kinds of aspects. The problems of performance comprise the 
evaluation of past performance, appraisal of existing administrative capacity, and 
estimation of future performance. In addition, “it also includes political performance, 
economic performance, and social performance”.30 In view of its complexity and multi-
dimensional character, there is no single way to appraise the performance of public 
organization or larger systems. Performance has both quantitative and qualitative aspects. 
                                                 
29 Metcalfe and Richards, Improving Public Management, p.30. 
30 Gerald E. Caiden, “Assessing State Performance,” in Politics and Administration in Changing Societies: 
Essays in Honour of Professor Fred W. Riggs, ed. Ramesh K. Arora (New Delhi: Associated Publishing 
House, 1992), p. 128.  
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There are many indicators to measure performance, including economy, efficiency, 
profitability, effectiveness, equity and flexibility. 
Indicators for Evaluating Government Effectiveness 
Once the problems of defining the desired goals or outcomes have been solved, we can 
choose valid and reliable indicators to evaluate government effectiveness. 
    From an applied perspective, in Singapore and New Zealand, governments use 
outcomes, namely social and economic conditions which a policy through its outputs is 
intended to address to measure government effectiveness. 31  In this way, “outcome 
assessment then becomes the most difficult aspect of performance assessment since 
outcomes are not easily commensurable and also may be influenced by other factors 
outside the control of a department”.32 Under this kind of circumstance, it is doubtful 
whether what is being measured can be done precisely and accurately. Therefore, the 
accuracy and precision of measurement may not be guaranteed. 
    Moreover, in the World Bank Governance Research Indicators Project done in 2002, 
scholars organized governance data in 20 cross-country surveys from firms, commercial 
risk-rating agencies, think-tanks, government agencies and international organizations 
into six clusters corresponding to the definition of governance: voice and accountability, 
political stability and lack of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule 
of law and control of corruption. And then they gave a ranking about government 
                                                 
31 David S. Jones, “Uses and Limitations of Performance Measurement in the Civil Service: An assessment 
from the Singapore and New Zealand Experience,” Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, No.2, 
(December 2000), p. 117; see also Andrew Kibblewhite, “Effectiveness: The Next Frontier,” paper given to 
the workshop, New Zealand Public Management: Lessons Learned and Future Development, p. 4.   
32 Jones, “Uses and Limitations of Performance Measurement in the Civil Service: An assessment from the 
Singapore and New Zealand Experience,” p. 117. 
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governance for 199 countries. 33  Government stability, quality of bureaucracy, 
institutional failure and efficiency, policy consistency and forward planning, bureaucracy 
delays, trust in police, efficiency in policy implementation and many other indicators are 
used to measure government effectiveness.34  From Table 1.1 below, we can see the 
specific scores about six aspects of the Chinese governance in 2002.  
Table 1.1 Governance Indicators for China 
Governance Indicator Year Percentile Rank(0-100) 
Estimate 





Voice and Accountability 2002 10.1 -1.38 0.17 9 
Political Stability 2002 51.4 +0.22 0.20 9 
Government Effectiveness 2002 63.4 +0.18 0.15 9 
Regulatory Quality 2002 40.2 -0.41 0.17 8 
Rule of Law 2002 51.5 -0.22 0.13 12 
Control of Corruption 2002 42.3 -0.41 0.15 10 
 
Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, " Governance Matters III: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (accessed on 10 
December 2004), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/sc_chart.asp. 
    Indicators used for this research project are concrete and helpful. However, three 
important problems still exist. First, it is the way researchers collected data. They listed 
indicators in the questionnaire to ask the public to choose. If surveys are not allowed to 
evaluate government effectiveness, then which methods and data can we use? The second 
one is that the objective of government is not only to provide services to the public, but 
also to assure to provide high-quality public services not at the expense of high 
administrative expenditure. Therefore, citizen perception alone is not enough to be used 
for assessing government effectiveness. We should clearly examine administrative cost of 
                                                 
33 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 
for 1996-2002,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (accessed on 11 October 2004), for data, full 
paper, further details, references, see http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance. 
34 Ibid. 
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the government, that is, how much local people pay for the public services. Lastly, we 
can apply citizen satisfaction to assess government effectiveness only when the 
government is a representative and democratic one and officials are elected by the public. 
Thus, for those autocratic regimes, officials are not elected by citizens, whether this 
measure is appropriate or valid is still a problem.       
Table 1.2 Indicators of Government Effectiveness in Italy 
 Indicators 
Policy Process 1. Cabinet stability                             2. Budget promptness                         3. Statistical and information services  
Policy 
Pronouncement 4. Reform legislation                          5. Legislative innovation                     
Policy 
Implementation 
6. Day care centers                             7. Family clinics                                
8. Industrial policy instruments          9. Agricultural spending capacity   
10. Local health unit expenditure      11. Housing and Urban Development 
12. Bureaucratic responsiveness       
Source: Robert. D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 65-73. 
 
    In his well-known book Making Democracy Work, Professor Robert D. Putnam argued 
that any serious measurement of government effectiveness must meet four severe tests: 
“it must be comprehensive, internally consistent, and reliable and also correspond to the 
objectives and evaluations of the institution’s protagonists and constituents”. 35  An 
institution’s effectiveness depends, first of all, on how well it manages its essential affairs, 
then how well it identifies social needs and legislates, finally, how well it implements 
policies or programs.36 Table 1.2 shows his twelve indicators in detail.         
                                                 
35 Robert. D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), pp. 64-65. 
36 Ibid., pp.64-65. 
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    When evaluating government effectiveness in Italy, Putnam emphasizes that 
“researchers must measure actions, not just words, and be careful not to give 
governments credit (or blame) for matters beyond their control”.37 Furthermore, he uses 
"institutional performance" and "institutional effectiveness" essentially as 
synonyms. Although one might find some conceptual differences between the two terms, 
from his point of view, these differences are slight. Putnam does not intend to use them as 
different concepts. His research is excellent for his research design and convincing 
conclusions. Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that the evaluation indicators are 
different in diverse contexts and we cannot use his list of effectiveness indicators literally 
as different local governments in other countries have different powers, responsibilities 
and competencies.                                                                                                                     
    Although research on the effectiveness of democratic governments has achieved great 
progress in Western countries, this topic is still new for most scholars engaged in Chinese 
public administration research. Especially, research on assessing government 
effectiveness with quantifiable and reliable indicators is rare. Only King Wai Chow’s 
PhD dissertation introduced the performance appraisal system of Chinese state 
administration from the perspective of theory and practice, however, it is less helpful for 
my research as his data and interviews were done in the early 1980s, and the evaluation 
system has changed considerably over the past twenty years.38 Additionally, there are 
many researchers engaging in the study of political leaders’ performance in China and 
possible factors which may relate to leaders’ performance, including Susan H. Whiting, 
                                                 
37 Ibid, pp. 64-65; also see J.Roland Pennock, “Political Development, Political Systems, and Political 
Goods,” World Politics, Vol.18, No.2 (April 1966), p. 421. 
38 King Wai Chow, “The Performance Appraisal System of The Chinese State Administration” (PhD 
dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1984). 
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Maria Edin, Pierre F. Landry, Kevin J. O’Brien, Li Lianjiang, Huang Yasheng and Bo 
Zhiyue.39
    Furthermore, when concentrating on the literature written in Chinese, I found out that 
few scholars pay attention on the effectiveness of local government. Based on the 
literature on hand, the definition on government effectiveness is still not clear. Some 
researchers treat “effectiveness” and “efficiency” as synonyms while others cannot 
distinguish “effectiveness” from “performance”. 40  In addition, in some papers 
“government effectiveness” almost has the same meaning with “government capacity”, 
that is, government’s ability to manage public affairs and interior operation.41 To sum up, 
in the literature in Chinese, government effectiveness is defined in an obscure and multi-
dimensional way. 
                                                 
39 The generic term used to refer to a government official in China is a cadre. In addition, about research on 
performance of local cadres and some possible factors which may influence on their performance, see Susan H. 
Whiting, Power and Wealth in Rural China: the Political Economy of Institutional Change, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 100-118; Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in 
China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly, No. 173 (March 
2003), pp. 35-52; Maria Edin, “Remaking the Communist Party-State: The Cadre Responsibility System at 
the Local Level in China,” China: An International Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 1-15; Pierre F. 
Landry, “Controlling Decentralization: The Party and Local Elites in Post-Mao Jiangsu” (PhD dissertation, 
University of Chicago, 2000); Pierre F. Landry, “The Political Management of Mayors in Post-Deng 
China” in The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 17 (2003), pp. 31-58; Yasheng Huang, 
“Administrative Monitoring in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 143 (September 1995), pp. 828-843; 
Yasheng Huang, “Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics Perspective,” Political 
Studies, Vol. 50, (2002), pp. 61-79; Tony Saich and Xuedong Yang, “Innovation in China’s Local 
Governance: ‘Open Recommendation and Selection’,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 
185-208; Kevin J. O’  Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1999), pp. 158-186; Zhiyue Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders: 
Performance and Political Mobility since 1949 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2002).  
40 Jianhua Li and Weiguo Guo, “Guande yu zhengfu xiaoneng,” (“Ethics of Officials and Government 
Effectiveness,”) Renshi yu rencai, (Personnel and Intellectuals), Vol. 9, (2000), pp. 31-34; Jianguang Cao, 
“Zhengfu chaoshi – zhengfu xiaoneng jianshe de yizhong changshi jiqi qishi,” (“Government Supermarket 
– An attempt and Implication of Government Effectiveness Construction,”) Journal of Fujian School of 
Administration and Fujian Institute of Economics and Management, No.4, (2001), pp. 18-21. 
41 Mingquan Xu, “On the Three Major Sectors of the Government Efficacy Construction,” Journal of 
Fujian School of Administration and Fujian Institute of Economics and Management, No.4, (2001), pp. 30-
33; Zebao Guo, “Probe on Some Issues Regarding Government’s Efficacy,” Journal of Fujian School of 
Administration and Fujian Institute of Economics and Management, No.4, (2001), pp. 6-9; Hongjun Su, 
“Ruhe tigaoxianji zhengfu xiaoneng,” (“How to Improve Government Effectiveness in the County Level,”) 
Techmoeconomics & Management Research, No.4, (1996), p. 27. 
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    A new evaluation system on the performance of local governments at various levels 
was just drafted in 2004 by the Personnel Ministry of the PRC that may result in rankings 
for cities that are similar to those of the universities. Table 1.3 below will show 33 
indices of the new performance evaluation system. As China now is underway to a 
market economy, essentially a government is not to control society but to provide service 
to the public. Therefore, as the director of this research project produced by Personnel 
Ministry, Sang Zhulai said, “government’s performance should be evaluated through 
whether the public -- individuals, enterprises and society as a whole -- is satisfied with 
that service”. 42  The "principle of satisfaction", supposed to be the final system for 
governmental performance appraisal, includes: economic evaluation, which requires the 
government to establish awareness of cost, save expenditure, spend less on doing more; 
“efficiency examination is the ratio of the government's input to the output; effectiveness 
evaluation is concerned about the quality of organization and the final effect on the 
society, and more importantly, effectiveness should be represented through people being 
satisfied and the social and economic development; equality focuses on whether the 
collective and individuals receiving services are treated equally and whether the minority 
groups are receiving more services”.43
 
 
                                                 
42 “China Sets Yardsticks on Gov't Performance,” (accessed on 15 September 2004), available from 
http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_Text?info_id=102793&p_qry=government%20and%20eff
ectiveness%20and%20china








Indices Tertiary Indices 
Per capita GDP  
Labor productivity Economy 
Ratio of external investment to GDP 
Average life expectancy 
Engel's Coefficient Society 
Average education received 
Environment and ecology 




environment Natural growth rate of population 
GDP growth rate 
Urban registered unemployment rate Economic adjustment 
Fiscal revenue and expenditure 
Improvement of laws 
Law enforcement Market monitoring 
Enterprise satisfaction  
Ratio of the poor to the aggregate population 
Crime rate Social 
management 
Traffic and industrial accident fatality rate 
Infrastructure 
Information transparency Public service 
Public satisfaction 
Rate of value added and guaranteed in state-owned 
enterprises 




Growth rate of profits realized by state-owned enterprises 
Proportion of administrative staff with bachelor’s degrees 
Leadership team-building Human 
resources 
Strategic human resource planning 
Ratio of corruption cases to administrative staff 




Ratio of administrative funding to fiscal expenditure 







Level of information management 




    Regarding indicators for evaluating government effectiveness, based on the literature 
review above, we can conclude that the list of measures for evaluating effectiveness 
should be comprehensive, including indicators of all the main spheres of activity of local 
government. Citizens and leaders in the government should broadly agree that the list of 
measures corresponds to the important tasks of the government; even through they might 
differ on the priorities among those tasks. We should be cautious to select indicators as 
functions and goals of governments may vary under different circumstances. Eventually, 
these measures should be “convergent” or mostly correlated with each other. If the 
indicators are not correlated with one another, this implies that government effectiveness 
is multi-dimensional. 
Explaining Government Effectiveness 
There are three major categories of factors used for explaining government effectiveness 
based on Putnam. These are institutional design, socioeconomic and sociocultural 
factors.44 Additionally, researchers argue that the extent of education and urbanization, 
social and personnel stability, and other possible factors might also affect government 
effectiveness in some cases. However, whether these findings above which are applicable 
for western countries, are also universal for all of the countries around the world is quite 
doubtful, and needs to be further verified.  
    Besides all the factors that Putnam has summarized in his book, recently in the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2003-2004, after examining global data, researchers found there 
is a small but significant correlation between legal origins (civil law, common law, 
                                                 
44 For details, see Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy, pp.83-120. 
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German law or socialist law) and governance performance today. 45  Meanwhile, 
“government performance at the city level is aided by the extent of the country’s 
globalization and urbanization path (controlling for income level)”.46 It means for some 
cases, the extent of urbanization and globalization may have a positive effect on city 
governance performance.  
    In the Chinese context, transforming and redefining government functions in the new 
reform era have been widely treated as the most important step towards improving 
government effectiveness and its performance by policy makers and academic scholars.47 
The other factors can be classified into four categories: (1) leadership, including 
leadership style, skills, behavior and characteristic; (2) civil servants, such as their quality, 
quantity and working efficiency; (3) institutional problems, for example, lack of checking 
systems and unclear government functions; (4) sociocultural factors and mores of a 
society.48
Research Design 
Reasons for Choosing Baoji City 
                                                 
45 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2003-2004 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), p. 147. 
46 Ibid., p. 154. 
47 The literature review on the government effectiveness in China can be found in Chapter 2. 
48 Jundeng Li, “Youhua zhiyue yinsu, tigao zhengfu xiaoneng,” (“Optimize Restricting Factors to Improve 
Government Effectiveness,”) Xingzheng Gaige (Administrative Reform), No.6, (2000), pp. 8-10; Zebao 
Guo, “Tuijin xingzheng tizhi chuangxin, shenhua zhengfu xiaoneng jianshe,” (“Promoting Administrative 
System Innovation and Government Effectiveness Construction,”) Journal of Fujian School of 
Administration and Fujian Institute of Economics and Management, No.2, (2002), pp. 33-36; Hongjun Su, 
“Ruhe tigaoxianji  zhengfu xiaoneng,” (“How to Improve Government Effectiveness in the County Level,”) 
Techmoeconomics & Management Research, No.4, (1996), p. 27; Zongping Wang, “Qiantan zhengfu 
xiaoneng jianshe,” (“Exploring on Government Effectiveness Construction,”) Tansuo yu qiushi (Exploring), 
No.12, (2002), p. 31. 
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My research concerns an evaluation of the effectiveness of local district government. 
Two districts of Jintai and Weibin in Baoji City are selected to conduct my research.49     
    Baoji City is located in the western part of Shaanxi Province. It is near Xi’an, the 
capital of Shaanxi Province in middle China. There are three reasons for choosing Baoji 
City as my case study. Firstly, it has medium rank in China in terms of the level of 
economic development. Baoji City can be regarded as a typical medium-sized city in 
China in many aspects, including its economy and population. Research results therefore 
have useful reference to other city governments in China. Secondly, Baoji City was 
selected to carry out tentative reform programmes like "the comprehensive economic 
system reform", "the reform of organization", "financial reform" and "the reform to 
optimize capital structure" after the adoption of the policy of Reform and Opening-up 
from 1980s to 1990s.50 It is one of the first pilot cities for many important reforms in 
China. Accordingly, through analyzing government effectiveness in Baoji City, policy 
suggestions derived from it will be more valuable for other local governments in China 
too. Finally, I selected Baoji City to conduct my study because of the availability of 
information. 
Measurement of Government Effectiveness 
When the missions or objectives of two district governments are identified, looking for 
appropriate indicators to evaluate the effectiveness of these two district governments 
become the major task. 
                                                 
49 Jintai District and Weibin District are the only two districts in Baoji City before May, 2003. Another new 
Chencang District was established in May, 2003. 
50 “An Economically Soaring City---Baoji,” (accessed on 13 October 2004), available from: 
http://www.baojitravel.gov.cn/index/english/brief/index.htm. 
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    My evaluation of government effectiveness not only measures governments’ words or 
objectives in the documents, but also their actions since we should be careful not to give 
government credit (or blame) for matters beyond their control.51 This is because social 
outcomes are influenced by many factors other than government. Due to different 
situations in various areas, both output and outcome measures are implied into the study.                
    After reviewing government functions and the official system for assessing 
government effectiveness in Baoji, I will evaluate the effectiveness of the two district 
governments in terms of their ability to perform functions and examine the extent of their 
goal attainment. Since “economic development, reform, public security and provision of 
high-quality social services” are the most important missions of the Jintai and Weibin 
District Governments, my own indicators and system are constructed to focus on these 
four important government objectives. Fifteen indicators are developed for assessing the 
effectiveness of the two district governments. Meanwhile, Qualitative and quantitative 
methods are combined together in my research to achieve a relatively valid measurement, 
compared with the existing practice in Baoji City.        
Methodology 
The case study and in-depth analysis are the methods I applied to my research. In order to 
acquire enough information for this research, during July to mid-August 2004, I spent 
almost one and half months staying in Baoji City to do my fieldwork. Altogether, I 
conducted 13 formal interviews with local government officials and had many informal 
conversations with local people. Data used for evaluating the effectiveness of the two 
                                                 
51 Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy, pp. 64-65; also see Pennock, 
“Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods”, p. 421. 
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district governments (Jintai and Weibin) are mainly from Baoji City Statistical Yearbook 
from 1999-2003 and Baoji Yearbook from 1999-2004. Besides, other important data were 
provided by some relevant administrative departments in Baoji City, such as Personnel 
Bureau, Civil Affairs Bureau, Police Bureau and Legislation Office. 
    Although my fieldwork was conduced in middle 2004, I will focus on the period from 
1998-2002 to do my research. It is because the establishment of a new Chencang District 
in May 2003 in Baoji City affected the distribution of land and population in other two 
districts of Jintai and Weibin I had chosen. This made the analysis results about these two 
districts, such per capita GDP, incomparable from 2003. 
 
Organization of the Thesis 
My thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter defines the research question, 
provides a review of the literature on the Chinese local government and government 
effectiveness, and describes the research design. The second chapter describes the context 
in Baoji City, such as its history, geography, population and society, and introduces the 
structure and functions of local governments. The third chapter is the most important part 
of the thesis. After reviewing the official system for evaluating government effectiveness 
in Baoji City, I construct my own indicators for assessing the effectiveness of two district 
governments of Jintai and Weibin. In Chapter four, I examine some possible factors 
related to government effectiveness and propose five policy suggestions.  
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Chapter 2 Functions of Two District Governments in Baoji City 
    This chapter focuses on the role of two local governments at the district level in Baoji 
City. It begins by providing background information on Baoji City and Baoji Municipal 
Government. After that, a detailed description of the structure and functions of Jintai and 
Weibin District Governments in Baoji City further illustrates the power and activities of 
the authority. This background information and analysis of the functions of local 
governments in Baoji City will enable us to assess and analyze the government 
effectiveness in the next chapter.   
 
Background Information on Baoji City 
The city of Baoji has existed as far back as 2000 B.C. Historically, it was the hometown 
of Chinese ancestor Emperor Yan. Accordingly, this area and the Xi’an area are regarded 
as the birthplace of the Han Chinese People- and of China itself. China grew from these 
areas and spread out across the land to cover its current domain. In the 350 B.C, this area 
was established as a city and named Chencang. Chencang became the cradle of the Zhou 
and Qin dynasties, as well as their major cultural centres. “Baoji City (which means 
“precious chicken” or “treasured rooster” in Chinese) received its current name under the 
Tang Dynasty (A.D 618-906).”1 Until the name changed in the 1950s, Baoji was called 
Pao-chi or Paoki. Due to its long history, Baoji City is rich in historic relics. With more 
                                                 
1 “About Baoji,” (accessed on 14 October 14, 2004), available form: 
http://www.emporis.com/en/wm/ci/?id=107107. 
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than 50,000 bronze wares unearthed, Baoji has earned the fame of being the Home of 
Bronze Wares in China.2
    Baoji City is 156.6 kilometres long from east to west, 160.6 kilometres wide from 
north to south. It covers a total area of 18,172 square kilometres with a total population of 
3,740,000 at the end of 2003.3 Additionally, it has a floating population of 51 thousand 
and 22.4 percent of registered urban residents.4 Based on the 1990 national population 
census, 99.44 percent of the whole population in Baoji city is Han Chinese.5  
    The geographical conditions of Baoji city are quite favourable (see attached Map 2.1 
and Map 2.2). “Situated at the west of Shaanxi Province and the juncture of Shanxi, 
Gansu and Sichuan Province, Baoji City was an important stop and a major commerce 
centre on the ancient Silk Road, attracting a large number of businessmen since the old 
times.”6 Located on the Wei River in Southwest Shaanxi, Baoji City has been developed 
as an important railway junction and centre after 1937 in western part of China. Three 
famous railways, Longhai, Baocheng, Baozhong, also meet there. It is also a hub of 
communication between the southwest and the northwest of China.7 Highways radiate in 
all directions, forming a network of four main highways and 110 branch roads linking 
Xi'an  (the capital of Shaanxi Province) in the east, Lan Zhou (the capital of Gansu 
Province) in the west, Yin Chuan (the capital  of Ningxia Province) in the north and 
                                                 
2  “An Economically Soaring City---Baoji,” (accessed on 13 October 2004), available from: 
http://www.baojitravel.gov.cn/index/english/brief/index.htm. 
3 “Baoji City,” (accessed on 14 October 14, 2004), available from: http://www.allnet.cn/english/0202.htm. 
4 Statistics Bureau of Baoji Municipal Government, Baoji Statistical Yearbook, 2003, pp. 5-6. 
5 Office of Baoji Local Chronicles, Baoji Local Chronicles, Shaanxi Renmin Press, 1999, p. 296. 
6 “Baoji Introduction,” (accessed on 13 October 2004), available from: 
http://www.gotravel.com.cn/eng/cities/shaanxi/01.htm. 
7 “An Economically Soaring City---Baoji,” (accessed on 13 October 2004), available from: 
http://www.baojitravel.gov.cn/index/english/brief/two.htm. 
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Cheng Du (the capital of Sichuan Province) in the south. It is only 2 hours driving from 
Xi'an International Airport along the Xibao highway.  
    “Baoji is the second largest city in Shaanxi Province and owns the fourth largest 
economy amongst the five provinces in the Northwest China.”8 With a strong industrial 
base, the city boasts 1,854 enterprises in the industries of machinery, building electronics, 
food, light industry, textile, chemical industry and building materials, occupying a capital 
of RMB 18.2 billion, employing 400 thousand workers and producing over 500 kinds of 
products, among which more than 180 kinds are exported to 50 countries and regions.9 
Baoji City has consistently achieved high economic growth rate. In 2003, GDP in Baoji 
City reached RMB 21.61 billion. Its annual economic growth rate was 12.6%, which was 
the highest from 1994. And its local financial revenue captured RMB 1.06 billion with an 
annual growth rate of 14.1 percent in 2003.10  
 
Baoji Municipal Government 
Before 2003, Baoji Municipal Government consists of two subordinate governments at 
the district level (Jintai and Weibin) and ten subordinate governments at the county level 
(Baoji, Fengxiang, Qishan, Fufeng, Meixian, Longxian, Qianyang, Fengxian, Taibai and 
Linyou). In May 2003, after the State Council made the adjustment to the administrative 
division of Baoji City, the dissolution of Baoji County was approved and Chencang 
                                                 
8  “An Economically Soaring City---Baoji,” (accessed on 13 October 2004), available from: 
http://www.baojitravel.gov.cn/index/english/brief/index.htm. 
9 “Baoji City, Shaanxi,” (accessed on 14 October 14, 2004), available form: 
http://en.townsfuture.com/e_version/city_introduce/shaanxi/c721000001.htm. 
10 Statistic Bureau of Baoji City, 2003 Baojishi guoming jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao (Statistic 
Gazette of Economy and Social Development of Baoji City in 2003) translated from Chinese to English, 
2004. From 1998-2004, the renminbi (China CNYor renminbi) is traded roughly in a narrow floating range 
between RMB 8.27and 8.28 yuan to the US dollar.  
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District was established. Thus, Baoji Municipal Government currently comprises three 
district governments (Jintai, Weibin and Chencang) and nine county governments. There 
are 138 towns and townships, 15 street offices, 178 neighbourhood committees and 2046 
village committees.11  
    Baoji Municipal Government launched its organizational reform in 2001 aiming to 
reduce the workforce and government’s interference in the day-to-day management of 
social and economic affairs. The number of the subordinate departments of Baoji 
Municipal Government was reduced from 57 to 34 with about 40 percent reduction (see 
Appendix 1 and 2). And the number of administrative staff was also decrease by 26 
percent.12 As a transitional arrangement, many specialized economic department were 
downgraded and placed under the management of the Commission of Economy and 
Trade, such as Commerce and Industry Office, Light Industry Bureau and Heavy Industry 
Bureau. On the one hand, the government is pushing for the development of a market 
economy, but while the market mechanism remains immature, it is still looking for ways 
to transform department functions and oversee market and industry. On the other hand, 
the powers of these specialized departments were reduced in order to prevent their future 
growth. In this sense, they eventually would be amalgamated into the larger Commission. 
Besides, some administrative departments were reorganized to meet the objective of 
                                                 
11The township and the street office can be viewed as independent governments at the same level in China, 
below the provincial, municipal, county or district governments. Traditionally, the township government is 
located in the rural areas while the street office is located in the urban areas. Concerning the neighbourhood 
committees (originally known as the Juweihui, recently reformed and called Shequ), they are the lowest 
administrative units in urban China and keeps updated records of all residents in their geographically 
defined neighbourhood. The village committees, the most grassroots mass organization in rural areas, 
govern the most important life and production elements, including money, grain, houses and land. Data 
from Statistics Bureau of Baoji Municipal Government, Baoji Statistical Yearbook, 2003, p. 1. 
12 Baoji Municipal Government, Reform Scheme of Baoji Municipal Government (Baojishi jigou gaige 
fangan), June 2001.  
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changing the government function.13 Departments performing similar tasks were merged 
with the purpose of reducing the workforce burden, overlapping functions and 
hierarchical redundancy. For example, the Prices Bureau and Investment Promotion 
Bureau were merged with the Commission of Development and Planning. 
    With regard to the functions of Baoji Municipal Government, as well as Jintai and 
Weibin District Government, it can be expected that they should be in accordance with 
ten specific functions stipulated in the Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and 
Local People's Governments of the PRC (amended in 1995).14  Their basic functions 
include implementing the resolutions from the upper levels, directing the work of its 
subordinate departments and governments, implementing the plan for national economic 
and social development, and conducting administrative work and providing social 
services to the local people.  
    Based on Baoji City Government Work Report, summaries about its development goal 
from 1998-2002 can be gleaned as follows: developing “Four Cities” (strong industrial 
city, strong stockbreeding city, famous travelling city and modern garden city) is the 
main theme, striving to deepen and widen the reform and open-up, expanding the scale of 
investment, expediting the reform of state-owned enterprises, promoting the development 
of non-public economic sector and developing education, technology, health, culture and 
other social matters.15 It is manifested that among all the government functions, the most 
                                                 
13 Che-po Chan and Gavin Drewry, “The 1998 State Council Organizational Streamlining: Personnel 
Reduction and Change of Government Function,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 29, 
(November 2001), pp. 553-572. 
14 For the functions of local government in China in detail, see Chapter 2, pp. 15-16. 
15Government work report is very important as it provides clues to the functions and objectives of local 
governments. Usually it is addressed by the leader of the local government in January or February of every 
year, like the governor or the head. It mainly consists of two parts: one annual working summary for the 
last one year, including the development condition in local region, the achievement and shortcomings of 
government work; another one is a working plan for the next year, including government objectives or 
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important task for Baoji Municipal Government in the past five years is to promote 
economic development.16 Baoji Municipal Government plays a very important role in 
promoting the development of local economy, especially during the earlier period of 
China’s transition to a fully-fledged market economy, as claimed by many scholars doing 
research on Chinese local governments. “Its activities may include transferring 
governmental functions to help the development of rural industries, seeking projects for 
enterprises, resolving the problem of shortage of special personnel for enterprises, 
providing credit guarantees for the management of indebted enterprises, improving 
infrastructure, opening overseas markets, fostering backbone enterprises, establishing 
enterprise groups, and developing economy of scale.”17  
    With reference to the argument claimed by Jean Oi, “China’s distinct state-led growth 
form can be viewed as Local State Corporatism where local governments fostered and 
supported these enterprises within their administrative purview and treated them as one 
component of a larger corporation”.18 My fieldwork trip also justified and reinforced Oi’s 
arguments as I heard and witnessed many similar events. Baoji Municipal Government, 
                                                                                                                                                 
goals, development strategies and some concrete measures. So, when evaluating government effectiveness, 
government work is crucial as it can help us to identify their objectives or missions clearly and quickly. See 
Baoji Municipal Government, Baoji City Government Work Report from 1998-2002.  
16 See Qiming Han and Xianke Yun, “Juesheng zai silu, fazhan kao chuangxin-Baojishi Jianxing kexue 
fazhanguan jishi,” (Success relies on the Way of Thinking and Social Development Depends on 
Innovation-Report on the Development of the Idea of “Scientific Development” in Baoji City), Baoji Daily, 
(accessed on 3 June 2005), written in Chinese, available from: 
http://www.baojidaily.com/show.php?id=5114. 
17 “Country Paper: China,” United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(accessed on 13 December 2004), available from:  
http://www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/country/china/china.html#ahead. 
18 Justin Yifu lin, Ran Tao, and Mingxing Liu, “Decentralization and Local Governance in the Context of 
China’s Transition,” (accessed on 23 September 2004), available from: 
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wkgb.asp.; see also Jean C. Oi , “The Role of Local State in China’s 
Transitional Economy,” China Quarterly, Vol. 144, (1995), Special Issue: China’s Transitional Economy, 
pp. 1132-1149. 
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as an intermediary institution, always endeavours to intervene in the management of 
enterprises by nudging them to merge or consolidate their resources. 
    In addition to promoting local economic development, Baoji Municipal Government 
also exercises a host of other functions, like tax levy, education, housing, leisure and 
amenities, public protection and a variety of social services. Due to the importance of 
economic development in contemporary China, other government functions are given 
less attention by Baoji Municipal Government. Hence, when evaluating government 
activities, economic performance becomes one of the major and inevitable indicators 
although it might be influenced by other factors beyond the control of the government.   
    Now, we can conclude that Baoji Municipal Government is a multifunctional 
organization. Among all the roles, it is true that Baoji Municipal Government’s principal 
role is a policy maker, regulator and monitor. Its major responsibilities are to plan, 
regulate, monitor and facilitate the activities of other agencies and organizations, and 
provide advice and possible finance to them. The municipal government decides the 
economic, social development strategy and public service provision. Subsequently, Baoji 
Municipal Government is a service provider, offering public service to the public. They 
themselves have provided the buildings and equipment, and employed all the staff 
necessary to deliver social services. Unlike the United Kingdom and other western 
countries where partnerships between local governments and the non-elected, private and 
voluntary sectors are particularly prevalent, Baiji Municipal Government is still the sole 
service provider.19
 
                                                 
19 On the functions of local government in the United Kingdom, see David Wilson and Chris Game, Local 
Government in the United Kingdom, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 82-98. 
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Background Information on Jintai and Weibin Districts 
Jintai District receives its name from “Jin Tai Taoist Temple”, where the famous Taoist 
priest Zhang Sanfeng once practised Taoism during the Ming Dynasty about 600 years 
ago. It covers 329 square kilometres with a total registered population of 378,000 in 2003, 
including 66.9 percent of urban residents.20 Traditionally, especially before 1978, Jintai 
District was the communication hub of Baoji City. However, by virtue of its geographic 
advantage, Weibin District has developed its own industry and commerce and gradually 
replaced Jintan District as the central district of business in Baoji City during the past 20 
years. 
    Weibin District was named for its geographic position: it is located near the Wei River, 
one of branches of the Yellow River. Vast expanse of land around provided Weibin 
District great benefits for enlarging and developing itself in the past two decades. It has 
an area of 728 square kilometres and a registered population of 376,000 with 70 percent 
of urban residents.21 According to the historical record in the Commentary to the River 
Classic (Shuijingzhu), the Yan Emperor, the ancestor of the Chinese population, was born 
in the present Weibin District. So, now following the Chinese lunar calendar, on 7th July 
every year, a large numbers of people from other parts of China and abroad attend the 
traditional sacrifice festival for Yan Emperor. Nowadays, Weibin District has become the 
political, cultural and economic centre of Baoji City. It is the place where the Baoji 
Municipal Government, People’s Congress of Baoji City and other administrative 
departments are located. The most crowded and busy commercial street in Baoji City and 
high-technology development zone are also situated in Weibin District. Detailed data on 
                                                 
20 Statistics Bureau of Baoji Municipal Government, Baoji Statistical Yearbook, 2003, p. 6. 
21 Ibid., pp 2-6. 
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population, area and some economic development indicators in Jintai and Weibin 
Districts from 1998-2002, such as per capita GDP, fiscal revenue and expenditure, 
average income of peasants are provided in Appendix 3. 
 
Structure of Jintai and Weibin District Governments 
Local governments at various levels in China need establish their own departments with 
same functions similar to those counterparts in their higher levels. Therefore, from the 
perspective of government structure, two local governments at the district level in Baoji 
City share some similarities with Baoji Municipal Government. As reflected in 
appendices 4 and 5, almost all the important departments in Baoji Municipal Government 
have their counterparts in the two district governments, like the Finance Bureau, 
Personnel Bureau, Education and Culture Bureau, Health Bureau and so on.22 In this way, 
national, provincial and municipal policies are expected to be implemented thoroughly 
and successfully by the district governments. Weibin District Government consists of 21 
administrative departments, 14 functional units, 6 townships and 5 street offices while 
Jintai District Government is made up of 24 administrative departments, 5 townships and 
7 street offices.23
                                                 
22 The Chinese bureaucratic system is complicated by the relationship between the vertical system of 
control of function (tiaotiao) and the horizontal system of governance by territorial area (kuaikuai). Every 
level of government is part of both a tiaotiao (vertical) and kuaikuai (horizontal) relationship with related 
government units. For example, the official in Education Bureau in Jintai District Government has to report 
both to the higher related Education Bureau in Baoji Municipal Government and local Jintai District 
Government. About government structure in local China, please see James Derleth and Daniel R. Koldyk, 
“The Shequ Experiment: Grassroots Political Reform in Urban China,” Journal of Contemporary China, 
Vol. 13, No. 41 (November 2004), pp. 751-752. 
23 Usually both the administrative department and functional unit are the government organs inside the 
district government. Functional units also belong to the public sector. The only difference between the 
functional unit and administrative department is that their financial sources. The government provides the 
whole fiscal funds to the operation of the administrative department while it only provides part of the fiscal 
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    Given the different situation in local areas, there are slightly different arrangements on 
government structure. Due to limited fiscal revenue in Weibin District, 14 functional 
units are set up in Weibin District Government to perform important functions and no one 
is established in Jintai District. Taking the establishment of the Bureau of Non-public 
Ownership Economy Development in Weibin District for example, it can make profits 
and partly afford its own operation expenditures through the management of private 
sectors and provision of business information, while Weibin District only provides the 
rest one.24
 
Functions of Jintai and Weibin District Governments 
It is a cliché, but true nonetheless, that the two local governments at the district level in 
Baoji City, are assuming a large number of duties. They exercise their functions and 
deliver a broad range of public services to achieve the government objectives. As listed in 
the government work report, economic development, reform, public security and 
provision of high-quality social services are the most important tasks for Jintai and 
Weibin District Government. 
Economic development 
Since 1978, economic development dominates the policy agenda of Chinese governments 
at all levels. This mainly involves harnessing local fiscal revenue, increasing per capita 
GDP and local people’s income.  
                                                                                                                                                 
funds to the operation of the functional units. However, the government has the final say on the number of 
civil servants in functional units.  
24 Bureau of Non-public Ownership Economy Development specializes in drafting plans to facilitate the 
development of the non-public economy, managing private companies and sectors through license issues 
and regulation, and providing information and policy consultations. 
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    From the Jintai District Government Work Report 1998-2002, it can be discerned that 
promoting economic development has been given priority by the government. It 
encompasses creating economic zones, adjusting the structure of agriculture, developing 
non-public economic sector and tertiary services. Moreover, Jintai District Government 
has proposed many concrete measures to carry out urban construction and planning, like 
rebuilding basic infrastructure. 25  Similarly, Weibin District Government regards 
promoting local economic development, enhancing fiscal revenue and people’s income as 
its work focus, as well as with a strong emphasis on improving investment environment 
and attracting overseas investors and funds.26  
Government reform 
“The 1998 national administrative reform sought to streamline government, remove 
direct governmental control over profit-making enterprises, and move China in the 
direction of the rule of law.” 27  Each of these efforts penetrated down to the local 
governments and resulted in workforce reduction in the governmental sector. In Baoji 
City, there were also two rounds of governmental reforms in 1998 and 2001 in an attempt 
to change government functions. These reforms were also guided by “idea innovation” 
and “system innovation” as advocated by the ex-president Jiang Zemin. Local 
governments at various levels in Baoji city, including the municipal and district 
governments broke from old ways of thinking under the planned economy and improved 
their adaptabilities and capacities to face the fast-changing society, such as improving 
government efficiency and considering more about people’s needs.  
                                                 
25 Jintai District Government, Jintai District Government Work Report from 1998-2002. 
26 Weibin District Government, Weibin District Government Work Report from 1998-2002, 1998-2002.  
27 Zhiyong Lan, “Local Government Reform in the PRC: Stipulations, impact, Cases and Assessment,” 
Chinese Public Administration Review, Vol.1, No. 3/4, (July/December 2002), pp. 213-214. 
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    Improving and strengthening the government’s own construction was highlighted in 
the Jintai Government Report. Jintai District Government also drafted some regulations 
to supervise the work of civil servants and its subordinate departments. Additionally, the 
leader of Weibin District Government stressed to conduct administration strictly in 
accordance with the law and build up one “diligent, efficient, uncorrupted and down to 
earth” government.  
Public security 
Providing police service is one of basic government functions for the Jintai and Weibin 
District Government. As one local official in the Jintai District Government said, the 
most significant reason for the existence of one government is to guarantee people’s life 
security and private properties.28 Furthermore, another important government function is 
to redistribute local fiscal revenue, offer necessary and timely social insurance and 
welfare, relief and assistance to the local people. In this way, social stability and a secure 
living environment can be created. 
Social services 
Education is still by far the largest public services offered by Jintai and Weibin District 
Government, accounting for nearly one quarter of all local government revenue 
expenditure from 1998-2002. The ratio of education expenditure to the whole fiscal 
expenditure in Jintai District ranges from 23 to 26 percent over the past five years while it 
is around 22 to 28 percent in Weibin District.29 Usually, the main tasks of the two district 
governments are to propose local education development plans, raise and supervise the 
                                                 
28 Interview with the previous head of Jintai District Government, Baoji City on 25 June 2004, Baoji City 
of Shaanxi Province, China.
29 Statistics Bureau, Baoji Statistical Yearbook 1998-2002. 
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usage of education funds and manage all types of schools and colleges directly controlled 
by them.30  
    One traditional government service concerns environmental health, it includes 
inspection, regulation, registration, licensing and certification. Some examples are the 
inspection of selling and preparing food; investigating infectious diseases and carrying 
out checks; control of environmental pollution; health and safety inspection of 
commercial and industrial premises. District governments also carry out environmental 
health policies according to directions from upper levels and provide financial and policy 
assistance to hospitals and clinics directly controlled by itself. 
    Since only the governments at the provincial and central levels have the right to sell 
land, the district governments of Jintai and Weibin only exercise part of the functions on 
land and housing management.31 The main responsibilities of the Bureau of Housing 
Management and Bureau of Land Management are to draft and implement housing and 
land development plans, manage real estate properties, “affordable housing” projects 
(jingjing shiyongfang) and other dwellings in Jintai and Weibin District.32  
                                                 
30 In China, public schools, state-owned enterprises and public hospitals are grouped into different levels 
and then managed by different level of local governments according to their hierarchies. For instance, in 
Baoji City, there are city-controlled, district-controlled and county-controlled schools. Accordingly, city-
controlled school are directly financed and managed by the municipal government and district-controlled 
school are directly financed and managed by the district government. 
31 For details, see “China Land Management Law,” (accessed on 14 June 2005), in Chinese, available from: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-08/30/content_1925451.htm 
32After 1998, the Welfare Housing Project went under the general name of affordable housing in China. 
Affordable housing refers to the commodity housing with the nature of social security and has the features 
of economy and applicability. Economy means the housing price is moderate and affordable for moderate 
and low-income households compared with the market price. Applicability means the emphasis on the 
effect of housing utilization in housing design and building standard specification rather than lowering the 
building standard specification. It belongs to common housing constructed by the government to solve the 
housing problems of moderate and low-income households. See Mingsheng Nie, “Policies and Measures on 
Housing of Chinese Low-income Households,” (accessed on 8 June 2005), available from: 
http://www.unhabitat.org/wuf/2004/documents/china%20low%20income%20housing.pdf.  
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    As all I mentioned above, indeed, Jintai and Weibin District Government are the large-
scale social service providers. Nevertheless, they are incomplete governments as some 
important government functions have been transferred to the provincial governments 
aiming to curb local protectionism and strengthen central authority, including the right to 
manage national land, conduct technology supervision and enact regulations on 
environment protection. 33 Furthermore, there is a shared expenditure responsibility 
between the district governments and their upper levels, even if it is true that local district 
governments’ responsibilities to deliver social welfare and assistance to the public. For 
importance of social assistance, actually the central and the provincial governments 
assume the majority of the financial expenditure to provide minimum life guarantee to 
the local people.34  
    On the one hand, the activities of the Jintai and Weibin District Governments cover 
almost all of the aspects of people’s daily life. They look like omnipotent governments; 
on the other hand, as a result of central control, they are incomplete governments because 
they share responsibility with their high levels in terms of expenditure, like the social 
                                                 
33 Interview with an official in Environmental Protection Bureau of Baoji City on 25 July 2004, Baoji City 
of Shaanxi Province, China. “Localities usually conduct protectionism under the name of 'assistance to the 
local economy'. Cigarettes, autos, alcohol, products with high revenue, often top the list of items subject to 
local protectionism. In a short-term view, such actions shield local enterprises from fierce competition with 
other Chinese cities, but in the long-term the result is just the opposite,” said Lin Jiabin, the vice-director of 
Society Department of the Development Research Center of State Council. “Regional Protectionism 
Weakening State Capacity,” (accessed on 1 June 2005), available from: 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Mar/9673.htm. 
34 Minimum life guarantee system is part of social security reform targeting at the people living below 
poverty line in local areas, such as the monthly salary of RMB 130 is the poverty live in Jintai and Weibin 
District. It had been established in all cities and towns; about 7.01 million urban and rural residents 
received minimum life guarantee relief. For details, see “Social Security System,” (accessed on 18 June 
2005), available from: 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/topic/bizchina/economicsystem/200409/20040900280066.html. 
Taking 2005 for example, to the minimum life guarantee of the urban residents, the annual fiscal budget in 
Jintai District Government is an amount of RMB 800 thousand. In contrast to the fiscal budget, only in 
February 2005, Jintai provided a total amount of RMB 4.96 million to urban residents. Remarkably, there is 
a huge fiscal gap.  The rest of the money is from the special funds of the provincial and central government. 
Data are from the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC, (accessed on 21 June 2005), in Chinese, available 
from: http://www.mca.gov.cn/callboard/index.asp# 
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welfare and assistance, even they lost some basic functions, including the land 
management. In contrast with the inappropriate interventions of Baoji Municipal 
Government and two district governments in the market and enterprise management, they 
disappear in the exact place it should assume its responsibility. Without the funds 
provided from the upper levels, they cannot fulfill some important functions. And also 
without the high-level approval, they have no discretion to deal with some certain issues, 
like environmental management.  
    This phenomenon is not a truly new one in Baoji City and actually it is a common one 
around China. Nowadays, Chinese local governments, especially those below the 
provincial level, have been widely regarded as incomplete governments in terms of their 
functions. 
 
Division of Functions among Local Governments in Baoji 
Two district governments of Jintai and Weibin and Baoji Municipal Government all 
perform the following functions: urban and rural development and construction, finance, 
culture and education, civil administration, social security and public order, medical and 
health affairs and others. The detailed division of social services between the municipal 







Table 2.1 Functions of Local Governments in Baoji City 
Functions Baoji Municipal Government Jintai & Weibin District Government 
Planning 
Short-term and long-term 
economic development 
strategy in Baoji City. 
To draft development plans for 
Jintai & Weibin District based 
on the development strategy 
from Baoji Municipal 




To draft regulations on budget, 
finance, audit and national 
assets in Baoji City; 
To regulate the distribution of 
national revenue in Baoji City; 
To manage the construction 
funds offered by Baoji 
Municipal Government.  
To draft local regulations on 
budget, finance, audit and 
national assets within its own 
jurisdiction; 
To regulate the distribution of 
national revenue in Jintai & 
Weibin District; 
To manage construction funds 




To draft regulations on levying 
national tax in Baoji City; 
To levy national tax in Baoji. 
To levy national tax in Jintai & 
Weibin District.  
Tax35
Local tax 
To draft regulations on levying 
local tax in Baoji City; 
To levy local tax in Baoji City. 




To draft commerce 
development plans in Baoji 
City; 
Trading management and 
industry management; 
Data collection and distribution 
on goods; 
To organize and coordinate 
technology development; 
To provide same services in 
Jintai & Weibin District as 
Baoji Municipal Government 
does in Baoji City; 
  
Reform (organizations & 
regulations ) 
To draft regulations to solve 
social issues with effect in 
Baoji City; 
To initiate government reform 
at different levels in Baoji 
City; 
To draft detailed local 
regulations based on existing 
regulations from  the upper 
level; 
With the agreement and 
authorization from Baoji 
Municipal Government,  to 
initiate government reform in 








To provide social welfare, 
assistance and insurance to 
local people who work in 
enterprises controlled by Baoji 
Municipal Government;  
To provide social welfare, 
assistance and insurance to 
local people who work in 
enterprises controlled by Jintai 
or Weibin District 
Government; 
                                                 




To provide police and juridical 
service within the area of Baoji 
City; 
To provide police and juridical 
service within the area of Jintai 
& Weibin District; 
Education 
To provide financial and policy 
assistance to education sectors 
controlled by Baoji Municipal 
Government; 
To provide financial and policy 
assistance to education sectors 
controlled by Jintai & Weibin 
District Government; 
Environmental 
Health   
To provide financial and policy 
assistance to hospitals and 
clinics controlled by Baoji 
Municipal Government; 
To implement environmental 
policies from the upper 
provincial government in the 
area of Baoji City;  
To provide financial and policy 
assistance to hospitals and 
clinics controlled by Jintai & 
Weibin District Government; 
To implement environmental 
policies from the upper 
provincial government in the 







To draft and implement 
housing development plans in 
Baoji City; 
Management of real estate and 
dwellings in Baoji City; 
To draft and implement 
housing development plans in 
Jintai & Weibin District; 
Management of real estate and 
dwellings in Jintai & Weibin; 
 
    Examination of major responsibilities and activities of the municipal government and 
the district governments would further illustrate us on their authorities in local 
governance. Four primary roles of the district governments in sequence are: 
1. Service Provision: the planning, resourcing and provision, directly or indirectly, of individual 
local services. 
2. Regulation: the regulation of the economic behaviour of individuals or other agencies in the 
public interest by insisting on their compliance with standards, rules and procedures of various 
kinds for exchange or provision of goods and services. This is where licensing, inspection, 
monitoring, registration and certification come in.    
3. Strategic planning: the provision of a longer-term planning framework to influence the 
activities of internal departments and external organizations in relation to individual service 
areas or authority-wide issues. 
4.  Promotion, advocacy and outsourcing:  the persuasion of one or more other organizations (e.g. 
private companies, voluntary bodies) to carry out activities which are likely to benefit the local 
communities (e.g. contracting out public toilet services to individuals, accepting grants and 
personnel assistance from voluntary organizations36). 
 
                                                 
36 Interview with an official in the Civil Affairs Bureau of Baoji Municipal Government, Baoji City on 2 
August 2004, Baoji City of Shaanxi Province, China.
 42
    As shown in Table 2.1, unlike Baoji Municipal Government whose primary role is to 
draw up policies, the major function of Jintai and Weibin District Government are to 
deliver social services. The district government is a more direct service provider, and 
delivers a wider range of services. It is in charge of organizing and managing the delivery 
of public services to the local people, sometimes with necessary financial and other 
supports from the municipal government. However, essentially the municipal government 
offers financial resources and policy assistance. Taking education for example, Baoji 
Municipal Government provides financial resources to the public schools controlled by 
itself, as well as participates in the management of these schools, such as Baoji City 
Middle High School. At the same time, due to limited education funds or an appeal for 
aid from the subordinate Jintai or Weibin District Government, Baoji Municipal 
Government may also provide necessary financial assistances to the public schools 
controlled by the district governments. However, it only checks the flow of money and 
supervises the usage of money without intervening in the internal management of these 
schools. 
    Moreover, the second role of Jintai and Weibin District Government is that of strategic 
planning and regulation in their own defined areas. Usually Baoji Municipal Government 
is responsible to draft economic development strategies and other regulations with effect 
in the area of Baoji City, including all the districts and counties. However, to avoid 
contradictions with high-level policies, these two district governments can only draft their 
own regulations in light of different local situations and then carry out them within their 
jurisdictions. As we all know, local governments of China comprise a hierarchical system 
and the lower level has to be subordinate to the higher levels. Hence, to some extent, the 
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government structure affects the way of fulfilling government functions. Jintai and 
Weibin District Government exercise their functions and powers under the guidance of 
Baoji Municipal Government.  
    Lastly, the rise of the Jintai and Weibin District Governments’ outsourcing contracts is 
truly a new phenomenon in recent years. It implies a reduced role for local authorities as 
direct providers. However, currently contracting out government services (also called 
“privatization”) only covers a limited range of areas, such as simple public toilets and 
street cleaning services. 37  Social organizations and voluntary associations also offer 
finance, technology and personnel assistance to the poor, disabled and old people. They 
work together with Civil Affairs Bureau to provide social subsidies and reliefs, which are 
part of the government functions. Therefore, at the district level in Baoji City, they have 
started to enter an area of alternative service delivery system incorporating local authority, 
voluntary sector and private sector provision. Although it is underway, outsourcing 
services may become prevalent in the near future. 
 
Conclusion  
I have sought in this chapter to identify the functions of the two district governments of 
Jintai and Weibin in Baoji City. It is true that their functions and scope of action have 
been reduced in recent years due to the control of the central government. However, local 
district governments are still large organizations with huge budgets, big workforce and 
responsibility for various social services. Among all the functions, boosting local 
                                                 
37 In 1998, Jintai District Government auctioned off the right to clean the 30 urban toilets to the public. The 
laid-off workers from the state owned enterprises account for more than one half among all the participants 
to this auction. After bidding, 29 people owned the toilet clean rights for about one year. At the end of 1998, 
they submitted a total amount of RMB300 thousand contract fees to the government. See Baoji Municipal 
Government, Baoji Yearbook 1999, p.276. 
 44
economic development is definitely the most important task for Jintai and Weibin District 
Governments. Since government effectiveness will be evaluated in terms of its ability to 
perform functions, a description of these functions provides a solid foundation for an 




Chapter 3 Assessing the Effectiveness of Jintai and Weibin District 
Governments 
 
    After reviewing the structure and functions of Jintai and Weibin District Governments 
in Baoji City, this chapter focuses on assessing their effectiveness. I will first examine the 
existing official system for evaluating government effectiveness in Baoji Municipal 
Government to explore how the municipal government conducts the assessment of the 
effectiveness of its two subordinate district governments. Furthermore, based on the data 
collected from 1998-2002, I will construct my own indicators to evaluate the government 
effectiveness of Jintai and Weibin. The limitations of my evaluation system will also be 
discussed.   
 
Cadre Responsibility System in China 
Since the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Part (CCP) has installed a cadre responsibility 
system (gangwei zerenzhi) in an attempt to strengthen its control over the evaluation and 
monitoring of local leaders. Under this current system, “there exists a set of quantitative 
evaluation indicators set up by the higher-level governments, and governments at the 
lower levels will be judged, rewarded or punished according to the implementation of 
these evaluation indicators”.1 Given the degree of attainment of the evaluation indicators, 
Jintai and Weibin District Governments will be judged by their upper-level Baoji 
Municipal Government. The party secretaries and government heads of Jintai and Weibin 
must sign performance contracts (gangwei mubiao zerenshu) with the high-level Baoji 
Municipal Government and pledge that they are personally held responsible for achieving 
                                                 
1 Justin Yifu lin, Ran Tao, and Mingxing Liu, “Decentralization and Local Governance in the Context of 
China’s Transition,” (accessed on 23 September 2004), available from: 
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wkgb.asp. 
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certain targets laid down by the municipal government.2 Economic affairs formally fall 
under the responsibility of the head of government while Party affairs fall under the 
responsibility of the Party secretary. 
    “Performance targets (kaohe zhibiao) are internally ranked in importance: soft targets 
(ruan zhibiao), hard targets (ying zhibiao) and priority targets with veto power (yipiao 
foujue).”3  Soft targets are usually those difficult to be measured and quantified, and 
policies that are not deemed important by the higher levels, like cultural and social 
development plans. Hard targets tend to be economic in nature while priority targets are 
more often political, such as, the amount of fiscal revenue submitted to the upper levels, 
is inevitably defined as a hard target in local areas in China. Veto power implies that if 
local leaders fail to attain these targets, this would cancel out all other work performance, 
however successful, in the comprehensive evaluation. There are two priority targets 
which are enforced nationwide, mirroring the importance which the CCP places on these 
policies: family planning (jihua shengyu) and social order (shehui zhi’an).4 From the 
ranking of the above targets, we can conclude that under normal circumstances, the CCP 
places economic development in the first place, especially the amount of fiscal revenue 
submitted to the centre. However, it is evident that “the bottom line is social stability and 
                                                 
2 Different contracts exist for different fields, such as industrial development, agricultural development, tax 
collection, family planning, social order, etc. 
3 For more details on the cadre responsibility system, see Maria Edin, “Remaking the Communist Party-
State: The Cadre Responsibility System at the Local Level in China,” China: An International Journal, Vol. 
1, No. 1 (2003), pp. 1-15 and Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre 
Management from a Township Perspective,” The China Quarterly, No. 173 (March 2003), pp. 35-52. 
4 The Chinese source Rong Jingben et al., Cong yalixing tizhi xiang minzhu hezuo tizhi de zhuanbian: 
xianxiang laingji zhengzhi tizhi gaige (Transforming from the Pressurized System to a Democratic System 
of Cooperation: Reform of the Political System at the County and Township Levels) (Beijing: Zhongynag 
bianyhi chubanshe, 1998), p. 271. Birth control is also referred to as a task to assume veto power in Kevin 
O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, “Selecting Policy Implementation in Rural China,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 
31, No.2 (January 1999), pp. 158-186. 
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that the CCP would not promote economic growth at the expense of large-scale social 
instability”.5  
    Additionally, each performance target comes with a numerical value. For instance, 
Jintai District was assigned the targets of collecting RMB 42.87 million in tax from non-
public ownership companies and achieving an annual economic growth rate of 15.4 
percent in 2003. Each target is also allotted a weight in a cadre’s performance appraisal. 
Taking the amount of fiscal revenue as an example, it may count for eighty points in the 
final evaluation system in which seven hundred points are satisfactory in Baoji City. 
More importantly, performance targets are not static; its contents vary among areas and 
over time, reflecting the priorities not only of the central but also of the local authorities.6 
Performance targets could be adjusted and new ones may be added in response to the 
changing circumstances. A typical example is that when the Party wishes to emphasize 
people’s health, prevention and cure of occupational diseases of rural immigrant workers 
has become a target in the 2005 annual evaluation for the government work.7
    Performance contracts not only quantify targets and spell out the evaluation procedure; 
they also specify the rewards or penalties that will accompany the levels of performance, 
including financial and political rewards. On top of these inducements, control over the 
career prospects gives the higher levels more leverage to ensure that a performance 
contract is taken seriously.     
                                                 
5 Edin, “Remaking the Communist Party-State,” pp. 1-15. 
6 Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China,” pp. 35-52. 
7 Mingyan Wei, “Zhongguo shou zhiye weihai renqun chao liangyi, fangzhi jiangru zhengfu niandu kaohe,” 
(More than 200 million people in China suffer the occupational diseases, government prepares putting the 
prevention of occupational diseases into the annual evaluation) Beijing Youth Newspaper (accessed on 11 
January 2005), translated from Chinese to English, available from: 
http://cn.news.yahoo.com/050107/346/27yny.html. 
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    “Performance evaluation is normally conducted annually at the time when a leadership 
team finishes its term in office.”8 Evaluation is usually done in three steps. First, the 
higher officials determine how well (usually in percentage terms) each target has been 
met. Then, they calculate a cadre’s score for each target by multiplying the degree of 
success by the value assigned to that target. Finally, they add the scores to come up with 
a cadre’s overall appraisal.9                                                                                                                           
    It has been well known that in the old Chinese communist planning system, mandatory 
targets were issued to the lower levels through the annual and five-year plans. Now 
guidance targets have replaced mandatory targets in the reform era. Local cadres are 
given more autonomy in choosing the means used to achieve the targets set by the higher 
levels. However, by implementing the cadre responsibility system, basically local 
governments at lower levels would follow CCP’s priorities to identify their own targets 
as it is highly related to local leaders’ personal bonuses and even, to their particular 
promotion. All these reasons above directly lead to a common phenomenon in 
contemporary China, that is, the selective policy implementation of the local 
governments. Local governments pay more attention to those policies which are given 
higher weight by the higher levels in the performance contract.  
    In this sense, as an effective incentive and monitoring system designed by the Chinese 
Central Government, current cadre responsibility system plays a significant role in 
shaping the local leaders’ behaviour. To consolidate the political power and guarantee 
their own political career, the behaviour of local officials would conform to what is being 
                                                 
8 O’ Brien and Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” pp. 172-173. 
9 Ibid., pp.172-173. 
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measured and “they would behave depending on how institutions are built”.10 With the 
cadre responsibility system, the CCP has successfully integrated its political control and 
economic motivation to strengthen the control on local leaders and local policy 
implementation.    
    In this study, the cadre responsibility system will be treated as the official system to 
evaluate government effectiveness in China. This is because in this system, high-level 
government, such as the municipal government, breaks down the objectives of its 
subordinate district governments into several specific and quantifiable targets, and then 
makes a set of evaluations of their work according to the extent of achievement of 
government goals. In this way, the cadre responsibility system thus becomes the one for 
evaluating government effectiveness as government effectiveness has been defined as the 
degree of achievement of government goals in chapter two. Hence, performance targets 
in the performance contract are also regarded as the official evaluation indicators for 
assessing government effectiveness. 
 
System for Evaluating Government Effectiveness in Baoji City in 1999 
In Baoji City, the first complete system for evaluating government effectiveness (namely 
the cadre target responsibility system) was enacted and implemented in 1999. Based on 
the official documents from Baoji Municipal Government, the subjects for evaluation are 
the district and county governments, administrative departments and all of the civil 
servants in Baoji City.11  Furthermore, this system has a total score of 1000 marks. It is 
                                                 
10 Maria Edin, “Why Do Chinese Local Cadres Promote Growth? Institutional Incentives and Constraints 
of Local Cadres,” Forum for Development Studies, No.1 (1998), p. 108. 
11 About the Cadre Responsibility System in Baoji Municipal Government in detail, see The General Office 
of Baoji Municipal Government, Baojishi dangzheng jiguan mubiao guanli zerenzhi kaohe zanxing banfa 
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made up of three parts: target responsibility (700 marks), fundamental management (200 
marks) and the appraisals from the masses and high-level municipal leaders (100 marks).  
    The evaluation of target responsibility mainly concentrates on those targets assigned 
by the Baoji Municipal Government. However, detailed contents about the targets were 
not listed in the official documents. Fundamental management primarily consists of work 
ethics, work principles, temporary tasks passed by the municipal government, party 
construction, social order and other daily work. Relevant administrative departments in 
the municipal government assume their own responsibilities to evaluate different aspects 
of fundamental management, such as evaluating the party construction, is the duty of the 
Supervising Bureau of Baoji Municipal Government. Finally, the Personnel Bureau of 
Baoji Municipal Government collects all of evaluation results from relevant departments 
and appraisals from the masses and the municipal leaders to make an appraisal on 
government effectiveness. And then the overall evaluation results are submitted to the 
standing working conference of chief leaders in Baoji City for further discussion. With 
the agreement of municipal leaders, the Baoji Municipal Government issues the final 
evaluation results to the public and other subordinate departments. 
      Final evaluation results for administrative departments in the municipal government 
are grouped into four categories: excellent, advanced, good and qualified units, while the 
evaluation results for the district and county governments are classified into three 
categories: advanced, good and qualified district or county. Moreover, in the original 
official documents in 1999, in order to encourage competition, the number of different-
level awards was stipulated clearly, as shown in Table 3.1. In addition to the number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Temporary Regulations on the Evaluation of Target Responsibility System of the Party Organs and 
Administrative Departments in Baoji City) (1999). 
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awards, the documents prescribes that only the excellent, advanced and good work units, 
advanced and good districts or counties can get financial rewards. All the financial 
rewards are provided by the Baoji Municipal Government from the local fiscal revenue. 
From 1998-2002, the total amount of financial rewards for each year was around RMB 
1.8 to 1.9 million.12  
Table 3.1 The Number of Different-Level Awards in Baoji City in 1999 
 
90 departments (units) in the  
municipal government 
12 subordinate 
district & county governments  
 




30% (28) 30% (28) 20% (18) 20% (16) 5-6 3-7 0 
 
Source: The General Office of Baoji Municipal Government, Baojishi dangzheng jiguan mubiao 
guanli zerenzhi kaohe zanxing banfa (Temporary Regulations on the Evaluation of Target 
Responsibility System of the Party Organs and Administrative Departments in Baoji City) (1999). 
 
 
    However, if one department in the municipal government is regarded as a qualified 
unit with serious problems, the head of the department will be punished with a fine of 
RMB 200, and the vice head with RMB 100. In the meantime, for any unit, district or 
county, if the public satisfaction rate for its work is below 80 percent and several serious 
mistakes, for example, corruption cases or gas explosion accidents involving death, 
happened in the category of fundamental management, veto power will be granted in the 
final evaluation. It implies certain serious problems which might bring ill fame for local 
region, will counteract other achievements of one department or local government. 
 
Revised System for Evaluating Government Effectiveness in Baoji City 
in 2002 
                                                 




Having learned the advanced management methods from Shanghai, Nanjing and other 
model cities, with support from the former major of Baoji City, in late 2002 the Personnel 
Bureau of Baoji Municipal Government revised the original system for evaluating 
government effectiveness and formed an updated one to evaluate the effectiveness of its 
subordinate governments at the county/district level (for details, see Appendix 6). 
    This revised system also has a total score of 1000 and comprises three parts: functional 
target, fundamental management and the appraisals only from the municipal leaders. 
Functional targets also play a significant role as they account for 70 percent of the whole 
score. Eight targets which mainly biased towards indicators of economic and social 
development in local areas are listed in the evaluation system as the functional targets. 
The total amount of local fiscal revenue and its growth rate are still vital for the final 
evaluation results as they constitute 180 of the total 700 scores. Moreover, the first, third 
and fifth items are also important as each of them carries 100 marks, that is,  the GDP and 
its growth rate, the amount of fixed asset investment and its growth rate, the amount of 
investment signed and transferred. In addition to the Government Work Report examined 
in Chapter Two, it is justified again from this new evaluation system that the Baoji 
Municipal Government regards economic development as its policy priority. 
    Among two versions of the system for evaluating government effectiveness in 1999 
and 2002, there are two differences deserving attention. First of all, in the revised system, 
the appraisal from upper-lever municipal leaders has taken the place of the combination 
of appraisals from the masses and the leaders in the original one. According to my 
investigation and interview, distrust of local people from the government is the major 
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reason for this great change.13 The municipal government doubts the quality of the local 
people. It holds an idea that the masses always evaluate the activities of the governments 
or officials from their own perspective. Consequently, it is difficult for local people to be 
free from prejudice to make an assessment neutrally. Nevertheless, from my point of 
view, the quality of local people cannot serve as the excuse to exclude people’s opinions 
from the evaluation. Regardless of their quality, since local government is the biggest 
service provider, as the service receiver, the local people have the right to express their 
own ideas on government work, and listening to their comments are the best way to 
improve the government’s effectiveness. Meanwhile, it is unavoidable that human beings 
make judgments from their own interests. The municipal government should treat 
people’s ideas in a positive way, to find out its own problems in performing functions and 
then to improve the work instead of simply neglecting people’s comments.  
    The second difference is that the financial rewards have been increased significantly, 
and the punishment is also becoming stricter in terms of the amount of fines. In the new 
2002 system, among two district governments and ten county governments, awards are 
classified into four sorts: two first class prizes, three second class prizes, three third class 
prizes and eight special awards.14 The chief leaders of the district or county governments 
who get the first class prize can receive a total amount of RMB 50,000 as the 
encouragement, 30,000 for the second class prize, 10,000 for the third class prize and 
8,000 for the special awards.15  Regarding the punishment, if one of eight functional 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 “Special award” is used for encouraging the excellent performance of governments in one certain field, 
like the economic development award for the area with the rapidest economic development and the tourism 
industry development award for the area with the quickest development in tourism industry. 
15 Usually, the number of chief leaders in a local government at the district or county level is about five to 
seven persons. Thus, it means each leader can get approximately from RMB 7,000 to RMB 10,000 if he 
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targets cannot be achieved, a fine of RMB 1,000 will be collected from the local 
government. Furthermore, each leader of the governments with the last place in the final 
ranking on the evaluation will be imposed a fine of RMB 500.16 In this way, financial 
rewards provided by Baoji Municipal Government in 2003 reached the peak over the past 
years with RMB 2.33 million.17
    By increasing the amount of financial rewards and fines for different performances, it 
is manifested that Baoji Municipal Government emphasizes economic motivations more 
than before. Generous bonus or fines, together with the control over career prospects give 
the higher levels enough leverage to ensure that a performance contract and their priority 
policies can be treated seriously by the lower levels.  
    In and of itself, the system for evaluating government effectiveness helps the secure 
and reliable implementation. By meticulously quantifying responsibility targets, it makes 
possible to assign work loads equally and conduct impartial evaluations for the higher-
level governments. Government performance also enhances in that this system creates 
incentives for the better job by establishing a clear link between the performance and 
rewards. 18  On the other hand, this evaluation system has its own shortcomings: it 
encourages selective policy implementation we have discussed before. In particular, it 
entices local cadres to ignore some popular and important policies that the higher levels 
                                                                                                                                                 
wins the first prize. Since the average salary of civil servants per month in Baoji City is around RMB 700-
800, this financial reward is a huge fortune for local leaders. 
16 All of the information above comes from The General Office of Baoji Municipal Government, Baojishi 
xinanqu mubiao guanli zerenzhi kaohe zanxing banfa (Temporary regulations on the evaluation of target 
management responsibility of districts and counties in Baoji City) (2003). 
17 Interview with an official in the Personnel Bureau of Baoji City on 28 June 2004, Baoji City of Shaanxi 
Province, China.
18 O’Brien and Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” pp. 158-186. 
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cannot readily turn into binding targets, such as employing democratic work style, 
practising the mass line and assuming social management.19
    Table 3.2 shows the evaluation results of the effectiveness of Jintai and Weibin 
Districts issued by the Baoji Municipal Government from1998-2002.20 As indicated in 
this table, Jintai District Government was more effective than Weibin District 
Government in 1998 and 2002. In 2000, they had more or less the same government 
effectiveness, while Weibin did better than Jintai in terms of government effectiveness in 
2001. 
Table 3.2 Evaluation Results of the Effectiveness of the Two District Governments 
 
Evaluation results of the effectiveness of two governments from 1998-2002  

















Qualified NDA Advanced Advanced Good 
 
Note: NDA means no data available. 
 
 
Limitations of the Revised Evaluation System of Government 
Effectiveness in Baoji City 
 
                                                 
19 The “democratic work style” is to stress the authority’s maintenance of ties with the masses of the people. 
Mao's mass-line theory requires that the leadership elite be close to the people, that it is continuously 
informed about the people's will and that it transforms this will into concrete actions by the masses. Henry 
C K Liu, “Part 2: The Great Leap Forward Not All Bad,” (accessed on 16 June 2005), available from: 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FD01Ad04.html. Social management covers a large of areas, 
education, public health and environmental management. 
20 Although this evaluation system is counted for a total of 1000 marks, Baoji Municipal Government only 
put the final results into several categories, not to rank them based on specific scores in the public notice. 
21 1999 evaluation results are not available from the Personnel Bureau of Baoji Municipal Government. 
Although in late 2002, Baoji Municipal Government has revised the old evaluation system, for limited time, 
it actually used the new one for the 2003 evaluation. In this way, 2002 evaluation of government 
effectiveness still applied the old system and old principle of reawards/punishments. 
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From the perspective of the higher level, that is, Baoji Municipal Government, the 
existing effectiveness evaluating system in Baoji City is quite satisfactory.22 It is because 
under this system, evaluation targets clearly indicate the work focus set by the upper 
levels, and the final evaluation results show which target is achieved and the degree of 
the goal achievement. By establishing this evaluation system, the Baoji Municipal 
Government could control and monitor the policy implementation of its subordinates.  
    However, some problems still exist in the revised evaluation system. First of all, it is 
about the setting of the indicators. Sixteen economic and social development indicators in 
the functional targets may not be appropriate and reliable for assessing the extent of 
economic and social development in local areas. If one wants to measure the employment 
conditions in local regions, the employment rate is definitely better than the number of 
allocation of labour listed in the evaluation index as the indicator. Another example is 
about the growth rate of stockbreeding production value. This measure may not be 
applicable to those areas with forestry and fishery as a dominated economy. Furthermore, 
these 16 indicators are not enough for measuring the pace of local economic and social 
development as they mainly cover the economic activities of the government. Other 
important government functions are neglected under this system, especially in the area of 
social management, such as education, environmental health, public order, and etc.  
    Secondly, many man-made and uncertain factors in the process of evaluation have an 
impact on the validity of the evaluation. Taking Taibai County for example, the amount 
of fiscal revenue in this county in 2003 actually cannot achieve the planned targets and 
lacked RMB 800,000. Before the Baoji Municipal Government publicized the final 
                                                 
22 From the interviews with officials and staffs from many different departments in Baoji Municipal 
Government, most of them all agree that current evaluating system is quite satisfactory and gave a positive 
appraisal about its impact, even if several problems may exist. 
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evaluation results, the head of Taibai County went to talk with the leaders of Baoji City. 
For failing to accomplish this target, the head gave his explanation: Taibai County is one 
state-level poverty county, which could receive agriculture and forestry tax waiver from 
the central government. If Taibai County could collect agriculture and forestry tax like 
other counties, the local fiscal revenue would be accomplished. The mayor and other city 
leaders accepted the explanation and subsequently changed the amount of the fiscal 
revenues of Taibai County, and finally Taibai County reached its target in 2003.23 With 
the top leader’s consent, the final evaluation result can be easily changed. The official 
evaluation system is designed with quantified targets and specific marking rules. 
However, in reality, in order to avoid the contradiction and balance the interests from 
different directions, the final evaluation results are often a tradeoff after bargaining 
among many parties, and not objective enough. In the case above, the leaders’ personal 
interference and informal interpersonal relationship between the officials exert a 
profound influence, or even a final say on the final evaluation results. 
    Contemporary China still lives under the rule of man as the Chinese society is actually 
made up of many personal networks. In the reality of Chinese politics, on the one hand, 
high-level governments monitor and inspect the activities of the lower levels. But on the 
other hand, since all the policies in the local areas are actually carried out by the lower-
level governments due to China’s vast size, the ultimate goal of establishing an 
evaluation system for the upper levels is not to simply encourage or punish local 
governments, but to make them improve their performance and conduct policies 
effectively by means of financial motivations. Under this circumstance, the final results 
                                                 
23 Interview with an official in the Personnel Bureau of Baoji City on 28 June 2004, Baoji City of Shaanxi 
Province, China.
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are not important as the local governments’ behaviour in the next year is more important. 
With reference to this background, we can also understand why the Baoji Municipal 
government presents the final results into a few obscure categories instead of announcing 
the special scores and ranking.  
 
An Alternative Method for Evaluating Effectiveness of the Two District 
Governments  
 
In view of the limitations in the existing system for evaluating government effectiveness 
in Baoji City, especially for the setting of the indicators, the major task of this section is 
to construct my own indicators and system to assess the effectiveness of Jintai and 
Weibin District Governments. 
    Government effectiveness has been defined as the degree of the attainment of 
government goals and it will be evaluated in terms of the governments’ ability to perform 
functions. Therefore, the first step of evaluating government effectiveness is to identify 
the governments’ objectives and functions clearly. Only when the agreement on the 
governments’ mission is achieved, can the extent of achievement of goals be measured. 
Since different stakeholders from various perspectives have diverse ideas on government 
objectives, several systems for evaluating government effectiveness have been 
established for various purposes. For instance, Baoji Municipal Government builds up the 
existing system to control its subordinates in terms of the policy implementation. It not 
only decides the objectives of the district governments based on its own priorities, but 
also sets them as the evaluation indicators to make an appraisal about the effectiveness of 
the district governments.  
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    From the academic perspective, I attempt to identify the governments’ objectives on 
the basis of the government work reports in the two districts.  It is because those targets 
listed in the government work reports have received a broad agreement between the 
leaders and local people. Both of them agree that the governments’ objectives approved 
by the annual meetings of local People’s Congress correspond to the important tasks of 
the governments, even though they might differ in the priorities among those tasks.24  
    “Economic development, reform, public security and provision of high-quality social 
services” are the focal point of the work of the two district governments in recent years. 
These government missions are indicated clearly and reinforced continuously in the 
official documents, as well as proved by local officials during the interviews.25 Hence, 
according to these four sets of indices, 15 indicators are constructed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the two district governments in Baoji City from 1998-2002.  
    To evaluate the degree of the achievement of economic development, four indicators 
are selected here: GDP per capita, fiscal revenue, the annual income of the peasants and 
urban workers. 26  All these four targets have been listed and highlighted in the 
government work report of two districts. Moreover, local people in Baoji City also agree 
that only a government, which can offer a higher income and prosperous life, is an 
effective government.27  
                                                 
24 Local People’s Congress in China is the local organ of state power. It has the power to enact, amend the 
laws and supervise the enforcement of laws and regulations. 
25 See Jintai District Government Work report, Jintai District Government, 1999-2003; also Weibin District 
Government Work Report, Weibin District Government, 1999-2003. 
26 Originally, I am supposed to use the income of urban residents as the measure. Unfortunately, I cannot 
obtain data on it. The income of workers becomes the alternative measure, even if it is not as accurate as 
the income of the urban residents. Here, peasants stand for the people living in rural areas. Urban workers 
are those workers living in urban areas. 
27 It is proved by some interviews and informal conversations with local people during June to August 2004 
in Baoji City. 
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    Government reform is also underlined by Jintai and Weibin District Governments 
through reducing the workforce and improving work efficiency to bettet service local 
people. There are three indicators used to evaluate the degree of attainment of the 
government reform, that is, the number of civil servants, the educational level of civil 
servants and their administrative expenditure.28  
    Additionally, government reform also means “innovation”, including “idea innovation” 
and “system innovation”. Even if China is still one party authoritarian regime, 
contemporary Chinese local governments tend to be more responsible for the local people 
and continuously develop themselves to face the changing environment. Can these two 
governments quickly realize the needs of the society and then propose timely solutions to 
deal with them? Are the laws or regulations enacted and passed by governments are 
complete and rapid enough to meet the needs of society? What’s more, how about the 
enforcement situation of these regulations? Do they have a great impact on the society? 
Indicators eight and nine are thereby constructed: the legislative innovation and 
legislative enforcement  
    It has also been well agreed that one crucial function of local government is to 
maintain social order and security. Accordingly, providing a safe and guaranteed life and 
working environment is the principal responsibility of one government. To assess the 
performance of the two district governments on public security, one indicator is chosen: 
the fiscal expenditure of the police and supervising departments.  
    Lastly, as the public service provider and problem solver, the government’s behaviour 
to deliver social services should be evaluated. Does it successfully fulfill its important 
                                                 
28 “Administrative expenditure” here consists of the salary of civil servants in local areas, purchase fees of 
administrative facilities, like chairs, desks and computers. In other words, administrative expenditure can 
be viewed as the administrative costs. 
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social functions, such as education, public health, housing and environment management? 
With no access to data and information on housing management, I will mainly examine 
three areas: education, public health and environmental management. There are 
altogether five indicators used for assessing the degree of government achievement in the 
three areas above: education expenditure and the number of students, the number of 
doctors and administrative staff in hospitals, and the environmental evaluation results. 
    Therefore, based on limited date resources, my indicators for evaluating government 
effectiveness cover the fifteen fields of local governments’ activities, as seen in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Evaluation Indicators of Government Effectiveness in Jintai and Weibin Districts 




1. GDP per capita 
2. Fiscal revenue  
3. Annual income of the peasants 




5. The administrative expenditure 
6. The number of civil servants  
7. The educational level of civil servants 
8. Legislative innovation  
9. Legislative enforcement 












11. Education expenditure  
12. The number of students 
13. The number of doctors  
14. The number of administrative staff in hospitals 
15. Environmental evaluation results 
 
Limitations of Alternative Method for Evaluating Government 
Effectiveness 
 
My system for evaluating government effectiveness aims to assess the effectiveness of 
Jintai and Weibin District Governments in Baoji City in terms of the extent of its goal 
achievement. According to the objectives defined in the two government work reports, I 
identified four major areas to examine whether they have attained their original missions, 
 62
including economic development, reform, public security and social services. My 
indicators are set up on the basis of the specific situations in the two districts in Baoji 
City. Therefore, whether this alternative system for evaluating government effectiveness 
is suitable for other local regions is uncertain because of China’s huge territory. With 
reference to diverse situations, in order to assess government effectiveness in different 
areas, indicators should be changed according to the various situations.  
    However, my evaluation system is still subject to some problems. In some cases, it is 
not accurate and valid enough. Taking the measures under the “reform” category for 
example, given no information available for evaluating the quality of social services 
offered by the government from the service receivers, such as the survey data about the 
local people’s satisfaction rate to the social services in the two districts, the evaluation 
result only based on three indicators listed is not so valid. Moreover, if data on the public 
health expenditure in the two districts are available, the evaluation category of public 
health services would be more convincing and reliable.  
    In addition, the indicators of economic development (GDP per capita, fiscal revenue 
and annual income of peasants and workers) may not only reflect the performance of 
local government, these might also reflect the economic efforts/activities of central 
government agencies, business enterprises, individual household activities and etc. 
Supportive economic policies from the central government indeed play an active role in 
promoting rapid local economic growth. In this sense, questions come: how much of such 
economic performance is due to local government and how much of it is contributed by 
the other actors. Taking the fiscal revenue for example, the total amount of fiscal revenue 
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reduced substantially in Weibin during 2000-2002.29 After careful scrutiny, two local 
events should be noted. The first event was the large-scale reconstruction of Weibin’s 
most busy business streets (Jingyi Road and Hanzhong Road) which was done during the 
same period. The second event was the bankruptcy of the four big state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) during 2000-2002 in Weibin. In short, the reduction of Weibin 
District’s fiscal revenue can be attributed to the closing of the shops on the two business 
streets and the bankruptcy of the four SOEs. 
    For this thesis, the major difficulty during my study is lack of information and data. 
Ideally, I attempt to cover important areas of government functions, like housing, into my 
assessment system. Unfortunately, I have to abandon this indicator due to lack of 
statistics. Lacking a unified statistical reporting system from year to year also directly 
leads to the waste of some important information for their incompleteness. Furthermore, 
when we consider the universal falsification of statistics on some important aspects in 
contemporary China, including GDP, peasant’s burden and fiscal revenue, the reliability 
of the statistical data used in my analysis would also be affected to a certain extent.30
    All the above constitute my difficulties in selecting indicators and constructing the 
evaluation system. As a researcher, I have to balance my choice in face of this dilemma 
by combining the qualitative and quantitative analysis together in an attempt to achieve a 
comparatively valid and convincing assessment.   
 
Evaluation Results 
                                                 
29 The amount of fiscal revenue is RMB 86.63 million in Weibin District in 2000, RMB 82.89 million in 
2001 and RMB 81.21 million in 2002. For detailed data, you can also refer to Table 3.4.  
30 About the falsification of Chinese statistics, see Thomas G. Rawski, “What’s Happening to China’s GDP 
Statistics?” (accessed on 22 June 2005), available from: 
http://www.pitt.edu/~tgrawski/papers2001/gdp912f.pdf. 
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(1) Economic Development 
Whether local authority can achieve the improvement in economic development has been 
viewed as the most important evaluation criterion for government work by the local 
people in Baoji. It is true that GDP per capita has been widely used to assess the 
economic achievement around the world. Concerning the different economic 
development level and population size in two districts from 1998-2002, the growth rate of 
GDP per capita during this period is chosen as the first measure. However, GDP per 
capita is only the value of all goods and services produced in the economy divided by 
population.31 It cannot accurately gauge the average national income in local areas and 
reflects local developmental disparity. We need to further examine the income of local 
people, including the peasants and urban workers. Similarly, by analyzing the growth rate 
of local peoples’ income from 1998-2002, we can explore the extent of the government 
efforts on it. Besides, the growth rate of the fiscal revenue is also the important task for 
the two district governments as it is treated as the priority targets in the official system for 
evaluating government effectiveness. 
    It is found from Table 3.4 that GDP per capita in Weibin District achieved greater 
progress than Jintai District in the past five years. However, the increase of GDP per 
capita, in other words, the increased national income in the two districts does not bring 
even distribution among the local people, especially between the peasants and the urban 
workers. With a higher growth rate of 97.7 percent for urban workers’ annual income, 
Weibin District Government made more efforts on improving the life of urban workers 
than the peasants from 1998-2002. In contrast, with a growth rate of 22.7 percent for 
peasant’s income, Jintai District Government paid more attention to improve the life of 
                                                 
31 (Accessed on 18 June 2005), available from: http://www.wwnorton.com/college/econ/stiglitz/glossg.htm. 
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local peasants during the same period. Since more than 75 percent of the population in 
both two districts is urban residents, with the higher growth rate of GDP per capita and 
the income of urban workers, who are the majority of the urban residents, Weibin District 
Government did better than Jintai District Government in enhancing the GDP per capita 
and people’s income.32   
Table 3.4 Economic Development of the Two District Governments 
 
 District 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Growth rate 
Jintai 11111 NDA NDA 14320 15357 38.2% GDP Per capita 
(Yuan) Weibin 11665 12701 13462 15541 16816 44.2% 
Jintai 4904 5069 5779 7221 8069 64.5% Average annual 
income of 
workers (Yuan) Weibin 5479 6459 8176 9857 10836 97.7% 
Jintai 2458 2661 2821 2905 3016 22.7% Average annual 
income of 
peasants (Yuan) Weibin 2208 2237 2390 2491 2593 17.4% 
Jintai 5314 5363 5632 5892 6470 21.8% Fiscal revenue 
(10,000 Yuan) Weibin 8358 8552 8663 8289 8121 -3.2% 
Jintai 5170 5751 6650 8455 8938 72.9% Fiscal 
expenditure 
(10,000 Yuan) Weibin 6164 7163 8831 9716 10793 75.1% 
 
Note: NDA means no data available. 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Baoji Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2002 and Baoji Local Chronicles Office, 
Baoji Local Chronicles, Shaanxi Renmin Press, 1999-2003. 
 
 
    From 1998-2002, the amount of the fiscal revenue in Jintai increased from RMB 53.14 
million to RMB 64.7 million with a growth rate of 21.8 percent, whereas it was reduced 
from RMB 83.58 million to RMB 81.21 million with a growth rate of minus 3.2 percent 
in Weibin. According to the data above, one conclusion can be made: Jintai District 
Government had higher effectiveness in collecting fiscal revenue from 1998-2002. 
                                                 
32 About the urbanization rate in the two districts, see Statistics Bureau of Baoji Municipal Government, 
Baoji Statistical Yearbook 1999-2002. 
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However, it should be emphasized here as discussed in the previous section, that the 
higher fiscal revenue in Jintai from 2000-2002 cannot be attributed to the better 
performance of Jintai District Government itself, but the bankruptcy of four SOEs and 
unprofitable business activities in another Weibin District. 
    As Table 3.4 shows, from 2000 two district governments in Baoji started to face the 
fiscal gap between the larger expenditure and smaller revenue. More importantly, the 
fiscal gap keeps enlarging, like Weibin District, from only RMB 1.68 million in 2000 to 
RMB 26.72 million in 2002, almost one third of the 2002 fiscal revenue. It is true that 
these two district governments depend on extra-budgetary resources to finance the rest of 
the expenditure.33 But, where the extra-budgetary expenditure comes from? According to 
my interviews and the official documents, it is primarily from bank loans. 34  Local 
governments borrow money from the domestic and foreign banks to offset the fiscal gap 
and provide necessary social services to the public.35  
    To sum up, the Weibin District Government did better in accomplishing the target of 
GDP per capita and the income of the local people, in particular, the income of urban 
workers from 1998-2002. With a minus growth rate over the past years, Weibin failed in 
boosting local fiscal revenue. 36  However, it depended on itself to overcome fiscal 
difficulty. Weibin endeavored to raise money via various channels, and then to support 
                                                 
33  About the fiscal management of local governments in China, see Word Bank Report, “East Asia 
Decentralizes,”  June 2005, (accessed on 18 June 2005), pp.97-99, available from: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/EXTEAPDEC
EN/0,,contentMDK:20516472~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1169052,00.html 
34 For details, see Baoji City People’s Congress, Report on the Fiscal Budget in Baoji City in 2002. 
35 Under the planned economy, local governments acted as agents in fulfilling deconcentrated functions of 
the central government, which bore the costs through revenue-sharing arrangements. During China’s 
transition to a market economy, however, incremental changes in revenue-sharing arrangements weakened 
and then severed link between retained revenue and expenditure needs, and local governments became 
responsible for financing their assigned function from own revenues and the fiscal gap occurred. Also see 
World Bank Report, “East Asia Decentralizes,” pp. 77-79. 
36 Based on data from Baoji Statistical Yearbook, a reduction of the company income directly leads to a 
decrease of the whole fiscal revenue in Weibin District from 2000. 
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local economic development. As a result, Weibin obtained a high level of economic 
development. Thus, Weibin District Government was more effective than Jintai District 
Government to facilitate local economic development from 1998-2002. 
(2) Reform  
The evaluation of the reform here aims to assess the ability that two district governments 
develop themselves by managing their internal affairs and local society by enacting 
regulations to solve social problems promptly.  
    When evaluating two district government’s ability to manage its internal affairs, 
essentially we will examine three indicators. One is the average ratio of administrative 
expenditure to the whole fiscal expenditure in the two districts from 1999-2002 (Table 
3.5).37 The second one is the number of full-time civil servants per 10,000 population in 
2002. The ratio of civil servants whose educational level is above college to the whole 
full-time civil servants then is the last indicator (Table 3.6).38  
Table 3.5 Average Ratio of the Administrative Expenditure to the Whole Fiscal Expenditure in 
the Two District Governments 
Average ratio of the administrative expenditure to                        
the whole fiscal expenditure from 1999-200239
 





















Note: NDA means no data available. 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Baoji Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2002.  
                                                 
37 Data on the administrative expenditure in 1998 is not available. 
38 Only data on the number of civil servants in the two districts in 2002 are available. Additionally, civil 
servants in China mainly include full-time and temporary staff. Temporary staff are also employed and paid by 
the government. The only difference between temporary and full-time staff is that they have not the identities of 
civil servants. On the basis of available information, I calculate the number of the full-time civil servants per 
10,000 populations. Detailed data about civil servants in two districts of Baoji City are listed in the attached 
Appendices 7 and 8. 
39 Taking the number in the table for Jintai in 1999 for example, administrative expenditure was RMB 
11,260 thousand and the fiscal expenditure was RMB 57,510 thousand in 1999 in Jintai District. 
Administrative expenditure divided by the fiscal expenditure, the ratio of 19.58 percent is got. 
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Table 3.6 Statistics of Civil Servants in the Two District Governments in 2002 
 
 The number of full-time civil 
servants per 10,000 population 
The ratio of civil servants whose 
educational level is above college to 
the whole full-time civil servants 
Jintai District 
Government 10.22 33.1% 
Weibin District 
Government 12.02 27.2% 
 
Source: Appendices 7 and 8.  
 
    Ideally, a government with fewer staff, minimum administrative costs and providing 
better service to the public is more effective in terms of its internal management ability. 
Unfortunately, information on local people’s satisfaction to social services, an important 
measure to measure the quality of the services delivered by the government, is 
unavailable among these two districts. Based on the above three indicators, my analysis 
follows: with 12.02 full-time civil servants per 10,000 population in 2002, there is more 
staff to provide service to the local people in Weibin than Jintai. With an average rate of 
17.66 percent administrative expenditure to the whole fiscal expenditure, Weibin District 
Government spends a smaller share of the whole fiscal expenditure to finance the salary 
of the staff and other administrative expenditure. However, given the statistics of the 
educational level of civil servants in Table 3.6, there are more highly educated civil 
servants in Jintai than Weibin. Hence, due to limited information, it is really hard to make 
a judgment which government had higher effectiveness in terms of internal management 
from 1998-2002.  
    Whether these two governments have the ability to solve social problems creatively, 
quickly and effectively needs to be further examined. Regarding the legislative 
innovation, all of the regulations passed by the two district governments after the 1980s 
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are compiled and analyzed for this assessment.40 One criterion is used here: Are the fields 
covered by the regulations comprehensive to meet the needs of the public? Table 3.7 lists 
the number of areas covered by the regulations from 1998-2002 in the two districts. 
There is a striking contrast between the two districts in terms of the total number of the 
regulations. With 33 regulations in the past five years covering nine areas, Weibin 
District Government can quickly identify social problems that need to be solved, and then 
draft regulations to deal with them. Moreover, with 14 regulations for economic 
development, it is proved again that Weibin District Government made more efforts to 
manage the local economy.  
Table 3.7 The Number of Areas Covered by Regulations in the Two District Governments 
 
The number of areas which regulations covered from 1998-2002  
 
Jintai District Government Weibin District Government 
Economic development 3 14 
Environmental protection 1 3 
Public health 1 3 
Social welfare & insurance 1 2 
Government management 1 7 
Education 1 0 
Housing 1 1 
Traffic 0 1 
Family planning 0 1 
Fire control 0 1 
Total  9 33 
 
Source: local Legislation Offices in Jintai and Weibin District government, Catalogue of Local 
Regulations in Jintai and Weibin. 
 
                                                 
40 Usually local regulations in the two district governments of Jintai and Weibin are first proposed by the 
relevant administrative departments, and then issued for enforcement in the name of the district 
governments, such as Regulation about the Reform and Development of Basic Education in Jintai District 
is first raised by the Education Bureau in Jintai and then publicized by the Jintai District Government in 
September, 2003. Based on my phone interview, since the proposal and formation of one regulation is a 
complicated process, which many parties might be involved in, each local regulation is absolutely 
necessary for local economic and social development. They gradually play an important role in solving 
local development conflict and disputes over the past years. Telephone interview with an official in the 
Regulation Office of Jintai District Government on 23 July 2005 from Singapore.
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    With regard to another area of legislative enforcement, regulation on the government 
procurement and regulation on promoting the development of non-public economy are 
selected for the examination. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 below show the extent to which the two 
regulations have influenced the policy aims. Due to higher saving rate of 18.8 percent and 
more concrete measures taken to improve government procurement, the regulation on 
government procurement has more significant effects on the Weibin District Government, 
like saving money for purchasing office equipment. Concerning the implementation 
situation of the second regulation in the two districts from 1998-2002, the Weibin District 
Government not only realized the importance of the development of private economy, but 
also put it into action. It drafted specialized regulations and built up the Bureau of Non-
public Economy Development to facilitate the development of private economy in the 
local region. Remarkably, with the setting up of the specialized departments, the 
development of private economy in Weibin achieved a greater improvement than before, 
demonstrated by the huge increase in the number of private enterprises and employed 
persons in 2000 and 2002. With reference to limited information in Table 3.9, the 
enforcement situation about the second regulation in the Weibin District Government is 
also better than that in Jintai. 
Table 3.8 Government Procurement in the Two District Governments from 1999 
 
Enforcement situation of the regulation on government procurement from 1999  
 









of Jintai District is 
set up on 2 April, 
1999 with four 
employees. From 1 
July 1999, this 
center started to 
operate. 




with a total 



















of Weibin District is 
also set up on April 
1999. 
Until 7 August, 
2002, this center 
had conducted 40 
cases with RMB 






More than six related regulations 
on government procurement are 
enacted by Weibin District 
Government. Weibin District 
continuously innovates in its 
procurement system. Given 
different situations, various 
procurement methods are adopted, 
like public bidding, competitive 
and enquiry procurement. Many 
new working methods are created 
and improved.       
 
Source: Mainly from Baoji Local Chronicles Office, Baoji Local Chronicles, Shaanxi Renmin Press, 
1999-2003. Also refer to internet information and some official documents in Baoji City. 
 
Table 3.9 Development of Non-Public Economy in the Two District Governments 
 
The enforcement situation of the regulation on the development of non-




  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Jintai 2768 3160 2955 2425 1896 The number of increased getihu 
(independent 
business operator) Weibin 2320 NA 19828 819 23250 
Jintai 127 115 124 130 126 The number of 
increased private 
enterprises Weibin 103 NDA 167 152 1018 
Jintai 6236 NDA 4624 NA 4250 The number of 
increased 
employees in the 
private sector 
Weibin NDA NDA  44710 
 
NA 51411 
  Jintai NDA NDA NDA NDA NDA 
 
Others  Weibin NDA NDA 
Weibin District 
Government set up 
Non-public Economy 
Development Office 
and drafted a series of 













Note: NDA means no data available. 
Source: Mainly from Baoji Local Chronicles Office, Baoji Local Chronicles, Shaanxi Renmin Press, 
1999-2003. Also refer to internet information and some official documents in Baoji City. 
 
    Regarding the innovation ability, similarly the Weibin District Government did better 
in identifying new social problems and solving them by enacting regulations in a fast 
changing environment.  
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(3) Public Security 
This section begins with a detailed investigation of government work in the area of public 
security from 1998-2002. Public security is one of the fundamental government functions, 
which is vital for peoples’ lives. Table 3.10 gives a rough picture of the two district 
governments’ measures and achievements on the public security work. 
Table 3.10 The Two District Governments’ Measures and Achievements on Public Security  
 
Governments’ measures and achievements on public security  
 
 
The number of all kinds of 
cases Awards 
The number of 






In 1998, local police bureau 
investigated 1014 criminal 
cases, 2451 cases on public 
order, arrested 3337 
criminals; 
In 2002, local police bureau 
investigated 1646 criminal 
cases, 2451 traffic accidents 
and arrested 268 criminals. 









In 1998, local 
police bureau 
mediated 1193 
disputes with a 
success rate of 
98%. 
 














In 1999, the number of 
criminal cases decreased by 
6% from 1998; 
In 2001, local police bureau 
investigated 1036 criminal 
cases, 2357 cases on public 
order and arrested 4512 
criminals; 
In 2002, local police bureau 
investigated 302 criminal 
cases, 1200 traffic accidents 
and arrested 450 criminals. 
 











In 1999, local 
police bureau set 
up 110 mediation 
committee to 
mediate 1378 
disputes with a 
success rate of 
98%. 




sub-teams and 872 
public order 
management 




Source: Mainly from Baoji Local Chronicles Office, Baoji Local Chronicles, Shaanxi Renmin Press, 




    Frankly speaking, the two district governments of Jintai and Weibin all made great 
efforts and adopted many methods to commit themselves to create a secure social 
environment for the public over the past five years. For instance, every year both of them 
investigate volumes of criminal cases and arrest many criminals. However, data on 
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governments’ efforts on public security in Table 3.10 are inadequate for us to learn which 
district did better in this area. This is because other possible factors may contribute to the 
number of criminal cases and traffic accidents, like the population and geographic 
position of the two districts. As Weibin District is located in the central part of Baoji City, 
a large number of floating population in the commercial street and the Baoji Railway 
Station might relate to more criminal cases and traffic accidents in Weibin. Thus, the 
governments’ measures and achievements on public security work here cannot serve as a 
satisfactory answer to explain the situation of public security in the two districts.  
Table 3.11 Per capita Expenditure of the Police and Supervising Departments  
 
Per capita expenditure of the police and 





1999 10.5 (270/25.7102) 8.21 (252/30.7073) 
2000 12.05 (334/27.7273) 9.24 (309/33.4434) 
2001 14.4 (386/26.8155) 10.03 (328/32.6867) 
2002 15.76  (427/27.0879) 11.08 (369/33.3014) 
Average 13.18 9.64 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Baoji Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2002. 
 
    Therefore, further analysis is necessary. The average per capita expenditure of the 
police and supervising departments in the two districts from 1999-2002 is calculated in 
Table 3.11. 42  As illustrated in this table, public security services delivered by Jintai 
District Government are more expensive. The average expenditure the every local 
resident paid for the public security service in Jintai District is RMB 13.18, and it is only 
RMB 9.64 in Weibin District. Moreover, the gap of per capita expenditure between the 
two districts has increased since 1999. Due to almost the same-quality public security 
                                                 
41 The expenditure of police and supervising departments divided by the total number of population, we can 
have the amount of per capita expenditure of the police and supervising departments in that year. 
42 The responsibilities of the police and supervising departments are all to provide service on public 
security to the local people. Supervising Department is in charge of impeaching and prosecuting criminals.  
 74
service offered by two district governments, Weibin District Government was more 
effective in providing public security service. 
(4) Social Services  
In addition to provide a safe living environment, another important function of the two 
district governments is to implement the local economic and social development plan, to 
deliver public goods and services to the local people, including electricity, water resource, 
education, public health, environment protection and etc. Therefore, the assessment of the 
achievement of social services is important for evaluating government effectiveness.  
    Education is an important evaluation area as it is the largest public service offered by 
the two district governments of Jintai and Weibin from 1998-2002. Two indicators are 
selected to measure their performance in the area of education: per capita education 
expenditure and the number of students, as gleaned in Table 3.12.43  
Table 3.12 Development of Education in the Two District Governments  
 
Per capita education expenditure 
from 1999-2002 (Yuan)44
 
The number of students from 1998-2002 
 
Jintai Weibin Jintai Weibin 
1998 NDA NDA 38952 49154 
1999 52.04 (1338/25.7102) 
51.23 
(1573/30.7073) 39644 49863 
2000 57.09 (1583/27.7273) 
59.32 
(1984/33.4434) 40729 50427 







2002 84.76 (2296/27.0879) 
88.31 
(2941/33.3014) 41257 52393 
Average  69.42 70.76  
Growth rate  5.9% 6.6% 
Note: NDA means no data available. 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Baoji Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2002 and Baoji Local Chronicles Office, 
Baoji Local Chronicles, Shaanxi Renmin Press, 1999-2003. 
                                                 
43 Education expenditure covers a range of areas, mainly the salaries of teachers, the purchase of teaching 
equipments and maintenance of school facilities. The students here consist of all students in the 
kindergartens, primary, secondary and high schools, polytechnics and colleges in Jintai and Weibin 
Districts. 
44 Data on per capita education expenditure in 1998 is unavailable. 
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    As reflected in Table 3.12, although in 1999, the per capita education expenditure is 
higher in Jintai, Weibin increased its investment in the development of education from 
2000. With an average annual RMB 70.76 of education investment per person over the 
past four years, Weibin District Government attached more importance to develop local 
education. Additionally, a growth rate of 6.6 percent in the number of students from 
1998-2002 allows us to make a conclusion: Weibin District Government made more 
efforts to attract and help more students to continue their studies, such as launching 
activities of educational propaganda, emphasizing the importance of education and 
increasing education investment. Concerning the examination results, Weibin District 
Government performs better than Jintai District Government in terms of its ability to 
exercise the education function. 
Table 3.13 Medical Resources in the Two District Governments  
The number of doctors per 
10,000 population45
The number of administrative staff per 
10,000 population in hospitals 
 
Jintai Weibin Jintai Weibin 
1998 36.40 (918/25.2211) 
35.06 
(1058/30.1749) NDA NDA 




























Average 36.91 33.29 24.35 24.675 
 
Note: NDA means no data available. 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Baoji Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2002 and Baoji Local Chronicles Office, 
Baoji Local Chronicles, Shaanxi Renmin Press, 1999-2003. 
 
                                                 
45 The changes of the number of doctors in two districts mainly arise from three basic resources: (1) fom 
the changes of some medical institutions, (2) from retirement, and (3) from natural death or deaths from 
diseases. 
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    Table 3.13 is the calculation of the number of doctors per 10,000 population and the 
number of administrative staff per 10,000 population in hospitals in the two districts from 
1998-2002. From this table, a judgment can be made on the local medical resources in the 
two districts, especially the doctor resources. With an average number of 36.91 doctors 
per 10,000 populations in Jintai District, it indicates there are more doctors per 10,000 
populations to offer medical treatments to local people than in Weibin District. In 
addition, in contrast with the increasing number of administrative staff per 10,000 
population in hospitals from 1999-2002 in Weibin District, this number decreased in 
Jintai District. In 1999, there were 22.59 administrative staff per 10,000 population in 
Weibin Districts and 26.25 in Jintai District. At the end of 2003, this number increased to 
28.96 in Weibin and also reduced to 23.63 in Jintai. Appropriate number of 
administrative staff is necessary and beneficial for the normal operation of an 
organization. But overstaffing the agency has been widely regarded as a kind of resource 
waste for effective agency management. With increasing administrative staff and 
decreasing professional doctors, Weibin District Government has to spend a lot to finance 
administrative fees instead of investing on the public health facilities, medical training 
and research. Hence, Jintai District Government has been more effective in providing 
public health from 1999-2002. 
    The final assessment area is the environmental management. In current China, the 
environmental protection and waste treatment have become salient issues for local 
governments because of the serious environment pollution problems. I do not intend to 
use air quality to measure the governments’ ability to conduct environmental 
management. I will examine the implementation situation of the environment policies. 
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Fortunately, in late 2002, the Baoji Municipal Government specially organized an 
inspecting team to evaluate the outcome of different district governments’ efforts in 
improving public environment, including these four aspects: city appearance, street 
appearance, restaurant sanitation, and public sanitation.46 The inspecting team is made up 
officials from different districts and departments and makes an appraisal mainly on the 
basis of cleanness and tidiness. The full score for each item is 100 marks. Table 3.14 is 
employed to measure the performance of the governments’ activities in environmental 
management in 2002. Among four areas, Weibin obtained the higher marks in three of 
them and its average score is also higher than Jintai. Hence, Weibin District Government 
performed better in managing environment. 

















Jintai  85.96 69.52 116.63 73.05 86.29 
Weibin  84.41 76.16 123.56 76 90.03 
 
Source: Baoji Daily, 5 August, 2003. 
 
    Regarding the three areas of education, public health and environmental management, 
the Weibin District Government has been more effective in advancing the development 
of education and managing environmental affairs, whereas the Jintai District Government 
did better in providing public health services. 
  
Conclusion 
                                                 
46 For details, see Baoji Daily, 5 August, 2003. 
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The task of evaluating government effectiveness in Jintai and Weibin Districts from 
1998-2002 is now completed. Table 3.15 below summarizes all the findings and offers a 
full picture of government effectiveness in the two districts in Baoji City. 
Table 3.15 Evaluation Result of Government Effectiveness in Jintai and Weibin Districts 1998-
2002  
 
             Economic                Reform                          Public                                Social 
            Development                                      Security                            Services 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                    Internal           Innovation                           Education      Public   Environment 
        Management        ability                    health 
 
HIGH           W       NA                  W                   W                W                  J         W 
 
LOW             J      NA                   J                     J                  J                  W             J 
 
Note: W=Weibin District, J=Jintai District. NA means not applicable. 
 
    As shown in Table 3.15, the Weibin District Government performed better in the 
promoting economic development. From 1998-2002, both the growth rate of per capita 
GDP and local people’s income in Weibin District are higher than in Jintai District. It is 
not possible to decide which district government was more effective in the area of 
internal management because of limited information. Nevertheless, the Weibin District 
Government had better innovation ability, including legislative innovation and legislative 
enforcement. Regarding the function of ensuring public security, since it is difficult to 
assess the quality of the service, we can only say that the Weibin District Government 
was more effective in providing public security in terms of lower service cost. Moreover, 
among the three selected social services, the Weibin District Government also had 
comparatively higher effectiveness as it did better in the two areas of education and 
environmental management.  
    In summary, with the higher government effectiveness in five fields among all seven 
ones, from 1998-2002 the effectiveness of the Weibin District Government was higher 
 79
than that of Jintai District Government. However, this is only a research result after 
comparing the effectiveness of the two district governments and does not mean that the 
Jintai District Government is not effective. Moreover, it should be noted that only four or 
29 per cent of the 14 interviewees agreed that Weibin District Government was more 
effective than Jintai District Government as the other ten respondents could not evaluate 
the effectiveness of both district governments.47
                                                 
47 The four interviewees are from the Secrecy Bureau of Baoji Municipal Government, the General Office 
of Chencang District Government and Weibin District Government, and the Research Center of Economy 
Development in Baoji City. They all argued the stronger economy of Weibin, such as the higher GDP and 
personal income, is the major indicator for them to vote Weibin. The rest of interviewees said it was quite 
difficult to give a comprehensive assessment about the effectiveness of two district governments since there 
were different performances of these two governments in various areas. In the eyes of those rest 
interviewees, economic performance is not the only indicator to assess the effectiveness of one government. 
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Chapter 4 Conclusion 
    This chapter presents preliminary policy suggestions for improving the effectiveness of 
the Jintai and Weibin District Governments in Baoji City. Based on previous research 
results, I first compare and analyze the differences between the official evaluation and my 
own evaluation results. I also explore some possible factors related to government 
effectiveness. Finally, I propose five policy suggestions to improve the effectiveness of 
the two district governments.  
 
Analysis of Evaluation Results 
According to the evaluation in Chapter three, the Weibin District Government was more 
effective from 1998-2002. However, it only received a higher effectiveness rating than 
the Jintai District Government in 2001 based on the official evaluation results. The 
immediate question is: why did the Weibin District government perform better under my 
evaluation system? How do we account for these two different evaluation results?  
    After analyzing the indicators and scores, differences appear to arise from three basic 
sources. First, in the official evaluation system, internal government management is 
neglected as a factor. Furthermore, the evaluation on the governments’ ability to cope 
with dynamic and changing environment (the “reform” category in my evaluation system) 
is also not included in the official system. However, this ability is the embodiment of an 
important function of local government, which stresses “innovation” (idea innovation and 
system innovation) in contemporary China. The Webin District Government had 
excellent performance in these two aspects as mentioned above, which partly leads to its 
higher rank in my final evaluation. Lastly, sixteen functional targets in the official system 
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basically focus on the economic activities of the government. However, in my evaluation 
and analysis, the examined areas are comparatively more comprehensive. And the 
evaluation on the government’s ability to manage social affairs is also given sufficient 
attention, such as in areas of public security, education, public health and environmental 
management. 
    For China’s current needs to construct a market economy, the official system for 
evaluating the government effectiveness in Baoji City may be more suitable since it 
indeed encourages the selective policy implementation of the district governments, that is, 
to carry out the policies assigned by their high levels and assist the central government to 
achieve the whole goals of construction of “well-off” society (xiaokang society) in the 
new 21st century. However, in the long run, the official evaluation method may not bring 
benefits for the welfare of the local people, as local governments care more about their 
supervisors’ needs than the people’s interests. This top-down approach does not easily 
respond to the local needs and aspirations.  
 
Explaining Government Effectiveness 
In the literature, institutional designs and legal origins have an impact on the government 
effectiveness. However, in my study, the two district governments of Jintai and Weibin 
have the similar institutional design (or government structure) and legal origins (socialist 
law). Therefore, I will examine the correlation between government effectiveness and 
other possible factors as discussed before, such as socioeconomic factors, sociocultural 
factors, education, and urbanization. 
Socioeconomic Factor 
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Aristotle has argued that “the prospects for effective democracy depend on social 
development and economic well-being”. 1 According to the report produced by the World 
Economic Forum, consensus among the scholars suggests that there is a direct causal 
effect from better governance to the improved development outcomes.2  Additionally, 
many researchers I have mentioned in the literature review argued that social 
development, economic prosperity and socioeconomic modernity may affect government 
performance. Conventional wisdom holds that richer countries are better able to afford 
the costs associated with providing a competent government bureaucracy, sound rule of 
law, and an environment in which corruption is not condoned.3 In my research, I will put 
such argument through an empirical test. In the Chinese context, fiscal revenue is the 
most appropriate indicator for measuring local governments’ financial capacity and the 
extent of economic prosperity. Data in Figure 4.1 help to examine the relationship 
between the local financial capacity and the effectiveness of local government.  




















Jintai 5314 5358 5542 5892 6470
Weibin 8358 8552 8663 8289 8121
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 
 Source: Baoji Local Chronicles Office, Baoji Local Chronicles, Shaanxi Renmin Press, 1999-2003. 
                                                 
1 Robert. D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), p. 11. 
2 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2003-2004 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), p. 145. 
3 Ibid., p.145. 
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    In Figure 4.1, the fiscal revenue in Weibin appears to decrease while the one in Jintai 
keeps increasing from 1998-2002. Jintai District invests more on the local people, has 
increased fiscal revenue to provide a competent government bureaucracy and social 
environment from 1998-2002. In contrast to a positive effect from better governance to 
the improved economic development, this finding shows that there is an absence of 
feedback from local economic condition to the effective governance in these two districts. 
Richer government cannot directly leads to the higher government effectiveness in Jintai 
District. A strategy of waiting for improvement of governance to come automatically as 
regions become richer is unlikely to succeed.4  
Education 
Table 4.1 Average Year of Education Accepted by Local People in November 2000 
 
The number of local people  











Jintai 10,888 3244 60,878 101,851 99,001 39,351 9.843 
Weibin 9214 2774 43,894 87,511 95,051 23,657 9.816  
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Baoji Statistical Yearbook, 2000. 
 
    The average year of education accepted by the local people is selected for measuring 
their educational level in the two districts of Jintai and Weibin. Data on educational level 
of local people are available for testing as shown in Table 4.1 only for the year 2000. 
Evidently, no major difference between the local people’s educational level in Jintai and 
Weibin exist, with an average 9.843 years of education for local people in Jintai and 
9.816 years in Weibin.5 Hence, a positive correlation effect from local educational level 
                                                 
4 Ibid., p.145.  
5 Sao Mang Ban is also called Wipe-out-illiteracy class, Sao means wipe out, Mang means illiteracy and 
Ban means class. I first assign different weights to the people with various educational level, such as 0 year 
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to government effectiveness cannot be found in my case study. The high educational 
level of the local people cannot lead to the high government effectiveness.  
Urbanization 
In the Global Competitiveness Report 2003-2004, after analyzing global data in many 
countries, scholars argued that early results supported the observation: governance 
performance at the city level is aided by the extent of the country’s globalization and 
urbanization path (controlling for income level); furthermore, the city’s relative size and 
its status as a capital or a port do not appear to have a deleterious effect on the quality of 
city-level governance.6  
 Figure 4.2 The Extent of Urbanization in Two Districts from 1999-2002 
 
87.59 87.74 88 88.09













Jintai 87.59 87.74 88 88.09
Weibin 75.5 76.29 76.93 77.31
1999 2000 2001 2002
 
 Source: Statistics Bureau, Baoji Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2002. 
 
   For my case, as the impact of the extent of the country’s globalization is same to the 
two districts, I want to test the relationship between the extent of local urbanization and 
government effectiveness. As reflected in Figure 4.2, Jintai is highly urbanized with 
                                                                                                                                                 
to illiteracy, 1 year to people participated in Sao Mangban, 6 years to the people graduated from primary 
school, 9 years to whose with secondary school certificate, 12 year for high school certificate and 16 years 
for college and above certificate. And then I multiply these different weights by the number of population 
under the corresponding educational level. Lastly, this total number is divided by the whole population of 
different districts in 2000. In this way, I receive the average 9.843 years of education for local people in 
Jintai and 9.816 years in Weibin. 
6World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2003-2004, p. 154. 
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around 88 percent of urbanization rate from 1999-2002. In contrast, the urbanization rate 
in Weibin only increased from 75.7 percent to 77.31 percent, still lower than Jintai. 
Without controlling the income level, one positive causal relationship may not exist 
between the extent of urbanization and government effectiveness. 
Sociocultural Factors 
From Plato to Almond, scholars seek to explain differences in democratic governance 
with local political culture, the development of civil society. In the Republic, “Plato 
argued that governments vary in accordance with dispositions of their citizenry”. 7  
Tocqueville highlighted the relationship between the “mores” of a society and its political 
practices. According to Putnam, the development of civil society contributes to the 
effectiveness and stability of democratic polity. 8  Civic associations, for example, 
reinforce the “habits of the heart” that are essential to stable and effective democratic 
institutions.9 They have “internal” effects on individual members and “eternal” effects on 
the wider polity. Internally, associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, 
solidarity and public-spiritedness. Externally, interest articulation and interest 
aggregation are enhanced by a dense network of association.10  
    In my research, the relationship between the development of civil society and 
government effectiveness will be examined in the Chinese context. I am supposed to use 
three indicators for measuring the sociocultural factors due to the available access to the 
data: the annual circulation of Baoji Daily; the ratio of the transportation and the 
                                                 
7 Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy, p. 11. 
8 Ibid., pp 88-89. 
9 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated, edited, and with an introduction by Harvey C. 
Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 57. 
10 Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy, pp.88-89. 
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communication expenditure to the total expenditure of each person in 1999-2002; and the 
number of civil organizations.11
    The first indicator is about the number of newspapers read by the local people annually. 
According to the Mr. Yuan, Director of Circulation Department of Baoji Daily, “over the 
past five years this newspaper has a circulation of 8,000 in Jintai District and a circulation 
of 10,000 in Weibin District.” 12 Therefore, based on the higher circulation of Baoji Daily 
in Weibin, we can conclude that more people in the Weibin District bought Baoji Daily 
than the Jintai District from 1998-2002. However, the number of newspaper read by the 
local people itself cannot serve as a valid indicator for evaluating the extent of people's 
interest in public affairs. 
    For the second indicator, with the higher total amount of expenditure per person in the Jintai 
District from 1999-2002 than the Weibin District, the ratio of the transportation and 
communication expenditure to the total expenditure for each person in Jintai is much lower 
than those in Weibin.13 From Figure 4.3, we can say local people in the Weibin District are 
more likely to spend money on exchanging information with friends and family members, and 
the communication frequency for local people in Weibin is higher for those in Jintai. However, 
when we consider Weibin District has an area of 728 square kilometres and Jintai District 
is 329 square kilometers in area, it is not surprising that the population in Jintai spend less 
money on transportation and communication than the population in Weibin as Weibin is 
more than twice the size of Jintai. 
 
                                                 
11 Baoji Daily is one the most popular and influential newspaper in Baoji City with a history of more than 
30 years.  
12 Based on a telephone interview with Mr. Yuan on 29 July, 2004 in Baoji City. 
13 The total amount of expenditure per person for one year in Jintai District is around RMB from 4100-4600 
1999-2002, while around RMB 3000-3400 in Weibin District during the same time period.  
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Figure 4.3 Ratio of the Transportation and Communication Expenditure to the Total 











Weibin 3.09 8.2 5.82 6.77
Jintai 2.6 3.34 4.87 4.9
1999 2000 2001 2002
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Baoji Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2002 
 
    The third indicator is the number of civil organizations in the two districts. Since the 
Bureau of Civil Affairs in Baoji Municipal Government only keeps complete data on the 
number of civil organizations from 2002, only one-year’s data are available for 
analysis.14  
Table 4.2 Statistics of Civil Organizations in the Two Districts in Baoji City in 2002 
 
 Jintai Weibin 
Scientific organizations NA NA 
Professional organizations 2 3 
Industrial associations NA NA 
United organizations 2 3 
Social 
organizations 
Foundations  NA NA 
Educational private   
non-profit organizations 10 18 Private  non-profit 









Total 14 24 
 
Note: NA means not applicable. 
Source: Bureau of Civil Affairs, Baoji Municipal Government, Statistics of Civil Organizations in Baoji City. 
 
                                                 
14 According to The Regulations of Registrations and Management of Social Groups of the PRC, all the 
civil organizations must register in the local civil affairs bureau. In principle, they must accept the 
leadership from the local government and have to act in accordance with the national laws and regulations. 
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    From Table 4.2, remarkably there are more civil organizations in the Weibin District 
than those in the Jintai District. The major difference between Jintai and Weibin is in the 
number of educational private non-profit organizations. Nevertheless, one important 
point is that both Jintai and Weibin do not have scientific organizations, industrial 
associations, foundations, or sporting private non-profit organizations according to Table 
4.2. This single indicator is not strong to prove that there are more civic activities and 
communication among the local people in the Weibin District.  
    On the basis of information above, there is no correlation between the development of 
civil society and government effectiveness. The extent of civil society’s development and 
prosperity in Jintai and Weibin may not contribute to the effectiveness of these two 
governments.  
    Because of the limited availability of data, my explanation about government 
effectiveness is certainly not complete or comprehensive. Other factors which may be 
associated with government effectiveness, like leadership (leadership skills, style and 
leader’s characteristics) need consolidation as well. It is because the majority of the 
interviewees during my fieldwork agreed that the management ability of the leaders, their 
ways of thinking, all exert significant influences on the local governance. Unfortunately, 
the leadership is hard to be measured and compared based on limited information. In the 
future, with more information and advanced statistical methods, further in-depth research 
to explore all the factors may become possible. 
 
Policy Suggestions for Improving Government Effectiveness  
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The following policy suggestions for improving government effectiveness are mainly 
derived from my research findings in Baoji City. These suggestions pertain to the two 
district governments of the Jintai and Weibin in Baoji City, but may also have useful 
reference to other local governments at various levels in China for improving their 
effectiveness. 
(1) The responsibilities or functions of the government should be clearly identified.  
As discussed before, there are many shared responsibilities among different levels of 
governments in Baoji City, like the land management, environmental management and 
social subsidy. However, a lack of clarity in assigning government responsibilities is a 
common problem in China. China’s 1994 Budget Law only spells out in broad principles 
the division of functions between the central and subnational governments, but is silent 
on the division of the labour between tiers of subnational governments. This leaves 
essentially all decentralized functions as concurrent assignments for the various 
subnational tiers.15 In many cases, due to the weak bargaining position of the lower level 
governments to the centralized political system, there is always a tendency of 
concentration of revenue to the upper-level governments and the delegation of 
expenditure responsibilities to the lower-level governments.16 As the World Bank report 
argued: 
This approach has led to two undesirable outcomes in China over the past decades. First, 
expenditure assignments are murky, with a good deal of uncertainty about which level of 
subnational government is responsible for what. With all subnational levels jointly 
responsible, no on is accountable. Second, this murkiness has worsened the fiscal status of the 
lowest tiers and adversely affected service delivery. In the Liangshan Yi minority prefecture 
                                                 
15  World Bank, East Asia Decentralizes, June 2005, (accessed on 29 June 2005), available from: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPDECEN/Resources/Chapter-2.pdf. 
16Justin Yifu lin, Ran Tao, and Mingxing Liu, “Decentralization and Local Governance in the Context of 
China’s Transition,” (accessed on 23 September 2004), available from: 
http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wkgb.asp.  
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in Sichuan Province, this lead to the elimination of free medical care and epidemic prevention 
program, among other services. 17  
 
 
    In my case study, the two district governments and Baoji Municipal Government share 
responsibilities, especially for the expenditure. And these shared responsibilities are often 
obscured with plenty of uncertainty about the responsibilities at the different levels of 
government. For example, in some years, Jintai District can afford all the education 
expenditure in its defined region. In other years it may encounter a short fall in the fiscal 
revenue to finance education, and need the financial assistance from the municipal 
government. Under these circumstances, these unclear government functions make the 
evaluation of government effectiveness difficult. 
    The simplistic assignment of complex services to a single level of government is not 
practical. Most countries around the world have overlapping functions. Nevertheless, 
during China’s transition from a planned economy to a market economy, clarifying 
responsibilities for regulation, financing, implementation, provision, and maintenance of 
assets is extremely important and necessary, as it is ensuring that these assignments are 
clear to all, including the public.18 Scholars have agreed that transforming government 
functions is the basic step for improving government performance. Only after 
successfully identifying government responsibilities and streamlining the relationship 
between government and society, government and market, is it likely for the government 
to achieve greater progress in improving its effectiveness or performance.  
    In this way, the first suggestion for improving government effectiveness in Jintai and 
Weibin is to make the division of work, labour, financing, service provision and 
                                                 
17 World Bank Group, East Asia Decentralizes, p. 97. 
18 Ibid., p. 97. 
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maintenance clear and concrete between different levels of governments, that is, the Baoji 
Municipal Government and two district governments. It is also important to define the 
areas the government should be responsible for. One typical example is that: it should not 
be the responsibility of the central government to intervene in the internal business 
management of state-owned enterprises. These enterprises themselves should be 
responsible for their business. 
(2) Governments’ missions or objectives should be clear, desirable, flexible and 
communicated.  
The district government’s objectives should be clear so that the employees can clearly 
identify their own tasks and responsibilities. Local people should be able to understand 
the various governments’ functions and assess their activities. Meanwhile, local 
government’s objectives should match people’s desirable goals so that people have 
confidence and strength to work together for accomplishing tasks. Moreover, local 
government’s objectives should be flexible and communicated to allow prompt 
adjustments and even changes of its missions to face challenges from the fast-changing 
and dynamic society.  
    Taking the objectives of the two district governments of Jintai and Weibin for example, 
obviously their missions are clear and quantifiable. They put economic development as 
their highest priority. They care more about the growth rate of GDP, the total amount of 
annual fiscal revenue than people’s daily life, such as whether local people have a secure 
and comfortable living environment, and whether they can obtain timely social subsidy, 
unemployment assurance and enough social welfare. In the official system for evaluating 
government effectiveness, the majority of indicators are used to measure the extent of 
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socioeconomic development in local areas. Only two indicators with 30 scores among the 
total 700 scores more or less relate to local people’s daily life, that is, the allocation of 
urban labour and the output number of labour. Even in 2004, these two indicators were 
cancelled by the Baoji Municipal Government mainly based on the chief leaders’ 
suggestions. 
    However, whether these clear goals are all desirable and on the right track? It has to be 
acknowledged that Chinese governments have achieved impressive accomplishments in 
improving local economy. In contrast to the great economic development, the delivery of 
public services to the local people is still lagging behind. In the existing system for 
evaluating government effectiveness in Baoji Municipal Government, few or even no 
indicators are designed to evaluate the social services offered by the government, which 
is the biggest service provider in the local region. It is a little ridiculous, but it is the truth. 
    Therefore, in the current official evaluation system in Baoji, more indicators used for 
assessing government’s ability to conduct social management should be added. 
Additionally, evaluation indicators should be comprehensive with an attempt to cover the 
important government policy domains. 
(3) The two district governments of Jintai and Weibin should pay more attention to 
improve their internal audit management, not only their administrative efficiency. 
For a long time, low administrative efficiency of the government has been regarded as the 
primary source for its low performance in China. Even in the Global Competitive Report, 
regarding the extent of bureaucratic red tape, China ranks lowest among 102 countries.19 
                                                 
19 Researchers sent questionnaires to companies around the world to ask “how much time does your firm’s 
senior management spend dealing/negotiating with government officials (as a percentage of time)?” Based 
on 1=0%, 2=1-10%, 3=11-20%, 8=81-100%, China obtained the highest score 3.9, which ranked the last 
place. For details, see World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2003-2004, p. 478.  
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Also, when we search in Chinese for “improving government effectiveness or 
performance” in the internet or Chinese academic journals, improving administrative 
efficiency shows wide acceptance by the government and scholars as an effective method. 
Similarly, in Baoji City, the municipal and district governments also have taken a few 
measures to improve their administrative efficiency, like cutting down the administrative 
procedures for the convenience of local people and companies. Enquiries from the local 
people through the telephones or letters should be professionally responded in a given 
time period.20     
    Nonetheless, the improvement of administrative efficiency does not automatically 
suggest the same as the improvement to government effectiveness. The definition of 
“administrative efficiency” is always confused with the one of “government 
effectiveness” in the Chinese context. Basically administrative efficiency is different 
from government effectiveness. The former highlights the working speed of civil servants 
and administrative departments when they serve while the later stresses the quality of 
service. High-quality service should be provided with the people’s satisfaction and a 
comparatively cheap and reasonable price.  
   In Jintai and Weibin District Governments, more attention has been given to improve 
the quality of civil servants and their service attitude and efficiency. For instance, public 
recruitment of the college students and strict regulations are drafted to guide the 
behaviour of the civil servants. But strengthening internal audit management to control 
administrative costs is neglected. Taking Birmingham City Council’s fiscal expenditure 
                                                 
20 Baoji Municipal Government, “Baojishi guojia xingzheng jiguan jiqi gongwuyuan gonggong fuwu 
xingwei guifan zanxing guiding,” (Temporary Regulations on Public Service Behaviors of Administrative 
Departments and Civil Servants in Baoji City) Baojishi Renmin Zhengfu Gongbao, (Gazette of People’s 
Government of Baoji City) Issue 4, 2003, pp. 19-20.    
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in the United Kingdom in 1997 for example, the dominant positions are the education and 
housing expenditure, together accounting for 60 percent. Administrative expenditure is 
included in the category of other services, below the 8 percent of the whole fiscal 
expenditure. 21  In contrast, the average ratio of the administrative expenditure to the 
whole expenditure in Jintai and Weibin from 1998-2002 is around 18 percent. 
Remarkably, given the limited budget, the two district governments spend more on 
financing the workforce out of line with international practice. The local budget for 
administrative expenditure should be cut accordingly.  
    Of course, a dilemma will exist in efforts to improve the quality of service and reduce 
the service cost at the same time. In this regard, introducing internal auditing system and 
cutting the workforce in Jintai and Weibin would be helpful. The establishment of a 
sound audit and supervising system to examine and check fiscal expenditure may restrict 
administrative expenditure to a great degree. More importantly, it is a good way to curb 
the corruption of officials and governments. Reducing the workforce can control the 
administrative cost, improve the incomes of civil servants, and reduce the risk of 
corruption by using higher salaries. 
(4) Public opinions and appraisals should be included in the whole evaluation.  
From the establishment of the PRC, over the past five decades, usually government 
performance evaluation in China is done internally, a model similar to a self-evaluation.22 
Under such an arrangement, local governments' performance is evaluated by their 
supervisors or different government bodies' performance is assessed by each other. Such 
                                                 
21 David Wilson and Chris Game, Local Government in the United Kingdom, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 
1998), p. 159. 
22 Fei Li, “Independent evaluation helps government improve,” China Daily, (accessed on14 March, 2005), 
available from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-01/24/content_411663.htm. 
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a model is subject to a host of problems. For example, top officials at the high-level 
government usually have a large, sometimes deciding, say on the ultimate assessment of 
their lower government. And when government bodies are assessing each other's 
performance, they tend to turn a blind eye to their respective defects and amplify their 
merits. In addition, the final outcome of the evaluation only comes out when it gives 
credit to the assessed, while negative ones will usually be kept in the dark.23  
    Concerning that impartiality and objectivity are seriously compromised in such 
evaluation frameworks, one popular and effective way in western countries can be 
introduced in China, that is, inviting one independent third party to handle the delicate yet 
complicated evaluation process. This independent third party could be a research 
institution, or a professional investigation company. In this way, appraisals produced by 
the third party about government work will be more objective. Meanwhile, public 
opinions can be taken into account to strengthen the feedback process. 
    As a typical example, at the end of 2004 a centre for the local government performance 
evaluation was set up in Lanzhou University in west China’s Gansu Province. This centre 
is the first of its kind in China. In order to gauge the local private enterprises' assessment 
on local governments’ performance, the Gansu provincial government entrusted this 
centre to handle the evaluation job, a task that was previously done by the government 
itself.24 This centre surveyed 18,000 private firms and delivered a comprehensive report 
to the provincial government based on its survey results in January 2005. Results show 
that the average satisfaction rate of the private firms to the local governments at the city 
level and below is 62.41 percent, the 59.20 percent of satisfaction rate for the provincial 




government. 25  Such a mechanism operated by a professional outsider will more 
accurately put the government performance in perspective.  
    However, in order to enhance its effectiveness, more institutions should be set up to 
introduce competition in the sector. And the results should always be made known to the 
public and subject to the public scrutiny.26 Furthermore, comments from local people 
should be incorporated to reflect real public opinions on the government work. With 
neutral stand and professional experiences, this kind of research centre or investigation 
company would produce more valid and convincing results, and also play an important 
role in local governance in the future.27
    Further, due to the reality of contemporary China that the development of professional 
and independent third party are still at a fledging stage, one compromised but feasible 
method to listen to public ideas for local government is to include the public appraisals 
and assessments into the official effectiveness evaluation system. Although this practice 
is still implemented by the government itself, at least it can convey a brief and 
comparatively complete public message and information to the government. From my 
point of view, without voices from the masses and the society, the validity and accuracy 
of the evaluation on government performance is questionable. 
    Therefore, in the long run, introducing public assessment into government 
effectiveness evaluation system in China will be more popular and become a visible fact. 
                                                 
25 “Pingyi xianshi: feigong qiye dui gansu zhengfu bumen manyilv zai liucheng,” (Appraisal shows: 
satisfaction rate of private firms to government in Gansu Province is about sixty percent) (accessed on 14 
March, 2005), translated from Chinese into English, available from: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-03/09/content_2674418.htm. 
26 “An Unbiased Assessment,” People’s Daily, (accessed on 14 March, 2005), available from:  
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/05-03-e/WEEKLY-200503.htm. 
27 Of course, the establishment of competitiveness among institutions and incorporation of public opinions 
from the local people into the official evaluation will produce a more valid evaluation result. However, for 
China’s specific situation, this expectation may not be realistic for the contemporary China, might need 
long time. 
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One good practice is that from 2006, in order to learn more about public ideas and 
formulate clear targeted public policies, the Nanjing Municipality Government started to 
entrust the Nanjing Public Opinion Investigation Centre to conduct a series of qualitative 
and quantitative investigations by the way of buying service.28
(5) The indicators for evaluating government effectiveness in Baoji City and the 
evaluation practice should be revised and updated.  
The official evaluation system in Baoji Municipal Government plays a very important 
role in the local economic and social development and its impacts are far-reaching. The 
evaluation system can be used for assessing, to keep track and examine the performance 
of governments. It can also be regarded as an effective motivation mechanism to 
introduce the competitiveness within the governments. Good evaluation results with 
appropriate financial rewards can encourage governments to work harder while the poor 
results with some criticisms can also be viewed as an alert. More importantly, these 
evaluation results are directly related to the local leaders’ political careers in the future as 
these results are used by the upper-level governments to make a decision on their 
promotion. For its importance, some problems in this evaluation system deserve attention.  
    First of all, with the development of the society, some indicators should be revised or 
updated for the accurate measurement, such as the use of GDP to measure economic 
development. In the past, GDP served as the sole criterion for the officials' performance. 
Recently, Chinese governments are considering the replacement of GDP with the new 
                                                 
28 “Nanjing: Government Buys Public Opinion in order to Formulate Good Public Policies,” (accessed on 
20 Feb 2006), translated from Chinese into English, available from:  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2005-12/03/content_3872296.htm
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concept of “Green GDP”.29 “Green GDP” strives to unify economic growth with the 
environmental protection so that it reflects the achievements and costs of national 
economy activities.30. Within three to five years, economic growth, social development 
and environmental protection would be taken into consideration for the appraisal of the 
performance of officials and governments in China. The adoption of this new indicator 
and system will make the assessment on government performance more accurate. 
    Secondly, a major feature of the evaluation practice in Baoji City is that the evaluation 
task is divided into several parts. Different functional departments are in charge of 
various aspects of the evaluation work and only the Personnel Bureau takes the final 
responsibilities to collect and compile data, to produce evaluation results. Data on the 
achievement of GDP, for example, are provided by the Statistics Bureau while the figures 
on local fiscal revenue are offered by the Financial Bureau. Besides, the Tax Bureau is in 
charge of collecting data on the amount of tax submitted by the private enterprises and 
Tourism Bureau conducts statistics on tourism income and the number of travellers. For 
this complicated and separated situation, it may cause one serious problem: the validity of 
data is doubtful. As we all know, only when surveys or investigations are conducted 
under the guidance of professional statistical method, the data could be regarded as 
considerably reliable and precise. In the context of Baoji City, different information 
sources, information collection methods and analysis procedures reduce data accuracy 
and encourage administrative inefficiency in collecting statistics and conducting 
                                                 
29  Green GDP means the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) calculated after deducting the cost of 
environmental damage occurring from economic activities. It is an adjustment to current GDP indexes. 
Created by the World Bank in 1997, green GDP involves methods to calculate the real national wealth of 
various countries. From Lan Xinzhen, “All for Green GDP,” (accessed on 17 March 2005), available from: 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200418/Business-200418 (A).htm. 
30 “Green GDP" index system is approaching: Interview,” People’s Daily Online, (accessed on 17 March 
2005), available from: http://english.people.com.cn/200409/15/eng20040915_157149.html. 
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evaluation work. Thus, the setting up of an independent information centre in Baoji City 
to collect, compile and analyze data is necessary for a convincing and satisfactory 
evaluation. 
   
Conclusion 
Building a sound system for evaluating government effectiveness is a difficult task. The 
success of this task will depend on establishing appropriate institutions and incentives, 
like the audit system, information centre and the financial rewards. In other parts of the 
world, the system for evaluating government effectiveness, supporting institutions and 
incentives evolved over the decades. China’s experience is at a nascent stage, especially 
at the local level. And the official system for evaluating government effectiveness in 
Baoji Municipal Government has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
    One of the most important features of this official evaluation system is the strong 
leadership of the Baoji Municipal Government. With the support from the chief leaders in 
Baoji Municipal Government, especially the mayor, this system is continuously revised 
and plays an important role to evaluate the effectiveness of local officials and local 
governments.31 Since the municipal leaders in Baoji City believed the statistical data 
about the amount of tax submitted by the non-public enterprises are not accurate and 
important, this item on the tax submitted by the private enterprises, including the growth 
rate and the number, was omitted in the 2004 evaluation. The allocation of urban labour 
and output number of labour are also excluded from the existing evaluation system in 
                                                 
31 Furthermore, even one local official proudly spoke to me that with the wise and open-minded municipal 
leaders, Baoji City could establish and revise this evaluation system to assess government’s behaviour and 
achieve great economic progress. Interview with the official of People’s Congress of Baoji City on 21 July 
2004, Baoji, China. 
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2004. With the power granted by the municipal Government, the Personnel Bureau drafts 
assessment policies and conducts the final evaluation. Furthermore, after discussions and 
agreements achieved among the leaders, the evaluation results can be finally decided and 
publicized. The story of Taibai County mentioned before is a good example. This kind of 
strong leadership eliminates or reduces obstacles from the involvement of other players, 
like local people’s congress (the legislative organ in local areas). At the same time, it 
helps to consolidate local leaders’ positions and power.  
    Moreover, as China is a communist country, this evaluation system decided by the 
high-level leaders naturally obtains the support of other departments and local officials. 
Relevant departments assume their own responsibilities to make an appraisal about the 
various aspects of government work. The subordinate district or county governments all 
treat this evaluation seriously. In this way, this evaluation system automatically gets the 
cooperation of other key players, like the press. The municipal government publicized the 
evaluation results via the newspapers and television. Therefore, even though it is not 
perfect, this evaluation system plays an important part in the promotion of local economic 
development.   
    Nonetheless, with the economic development and the improvement of people’s living 
standards, the needs of the public would inevitably diversify. Under this circumstance, 
meeting people’s needs and making people satisfied with the public services offered by 
the local government will be a more demanding task. People need to express their ideas 
to government agencies via various communication channels and gradually participate 
into the process of policy formulation and evaluation. 32  In the near future, local 
                                                 
32 China's first public hearing over an environment issue was held in April 2005, with the debate focused on 
a suspended project to line the lake bed of Yuanmingyuan garden in Beijing's western suburbs with a 
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governments would face a changed situation: to share responsibility and power with other 
parties, like the press, the masses and civil organizations. The coordination and 
cooperation with different parties would be a challenge. Responses to the local people’s 
needs and desires would have to be considered when governments conduct evaluation.  
    In conclusion, I propose five recommendations to improve government effectiveness in 
the two districts of Jintai and Weibin in Baoji City. The responsibilities or functions of 
the government should be clearly identified. Government missions or objectives should 
be clear, desirable, flexible and communicated. In addition, local government should pay 
more attention to improve its internal audit management not only its administrative 
efficiency. Public opinions and appraisals should be included in the evaluation. The 
indicators for evaluating government effectiveness and evaluation practice in Baoji 
Municipal Government should be revised and updated with the development of society.  
    Finally, insufficient information in choosing effectiveness evaluation indicators and 
designing the evaluating system constitute the limitations in my study, and cannot make 
the constructed evaluation system so prefect. In this sense, whether my research findings 
in two district governments in Baoji City are applicable to other local regions in China is 
an empirical question. However, it is hoped that this exploratory study on government 
effectiveness in the Jintai and Weibin District Governments would provide useful 
information and encourage other scholars to initiate research on the effectiveness of local 
governments in other provinces in China. 
                                                                                                                                                 
plastic membrane. The hearing, lasting four hours and a half, allowed 120 delegates from all social circles 
to express their opinions over the project's impact over the soil, ground water and its surrounding terrestrial 
ecosystem. “China holds environment hearing over disputed project in imperial garden,” (accessed on 11 
August 11, 2005), available from: http://english1.people.com.cn/200504/14/eng20050414_181007.html. In 
addition, more public hearings will be held on ticket price adjustments on nationwide tourist sites and train 
ticket price adjustments. Although whether the governments will accept people’s opinions about certain 
public issues through public hearings is still not sure, this kind of public hearing can be viewed as the 
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Map 2.1 Map of Baoji City 
 
 








Map 2.2 Map of Baoji City in Shaanxi Province 
 




































1. The General Office of Municipal Government   
2. Commission of Planning                             
3. Commission of Economy and Trade 
4. Commission of Economic System Reform  
5. Commission of Science and Technology    6.Commission of Education 
7. Police Bureau                                              8. National Security Bureau 
9. Bureau of Civil Affairs                               10. Judicial Bureau 
11. Finance Bureau                                         12. Personnel Bureau 
13. Labour Bureau                                            14. Urban Planning Bureau 
15. Bureau of Urban and Rural Construction and Management  
16. Bureau of Environmental Protection         17. Housing Management Bureau 
18. Agriculture Bureau                                    19. Forestry Bureau 
20. Water Resources Bureau                           21. Land Management Bureau 
22. Township Enterprise Management Bureau 
23. Machinery and Electronic Industry Bureau  
24. Light Industry Bureau                              
25. Heavy Industry 
26. Commerce Bureau                                    
27. Bureau of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation 
28. Transport Bureau                                       29. Bureau of Auditing 
30. Bureau of Culture                                      31. Bureau of Broadcast and Television 
32. Bureau of Cultural Relics                            33. Bureau of Health 
34. Commission of Family Planning               35. Committee of Physical Exercises 
36. Tourism Bureau For foreign Affairs         37. Bureau of Statistics 
38. Bureau of Industrial and Commercial Administration 
39. Technology Supervising Bureau               40. Bureau of Complaint  
41. Bureau of State Assets Management         42. Local Tax Bureau 
43. Office of Agriculture Development           44. Bureau of Prices 
45. Research Centre for Economic and Social Development 
46. Baoji Local Chronicles Office                   
47. Seismological Bureau 
48. Bureau of Grains                                       
49. Parent Company of Textile Industry of Baoji City 
50. Trust and Investment Company of Baoji City 
51. Supply And Marketing Cooperatives of Baoji City 
52. Parent Company of Second Light Industry of Baoji City 
53. Baoji People Aerial Defense Office  
54. Baoji Spiritual Civilization Office (Patriotic Public Health Committee) 
55. Commission of Baoji High-Technology Industry Development Zones 
56. Baoji Office of Coordination for ministerial and Provincial Enterprises 
57. Association of Food Industry of Baoji City 
 
 
Source: Baoji Municipal Government, Reform Scheme of Baoji Municipal Government (Baojishi 
jigou gaige fangan), June 2001.  
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1. The General Office of Municipal Government   
2. Commission of Development and Planning (Prices Bureau) 
3. Commission of Economy and Trade 
4. Bureau of Civil Affairs (Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs)  
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1. People Aerial Defence Office, Committee of National Defense 
and Mobilization   
2. Leading Group Office of Comprehensive Agricultural 














1. Research Centre for Development 
2. Office of local Chronicles 
3. Seismological Bureau 
4. Bureau of Cultural Relics                             
5. Bureau of Township Enterprises  
6. Bureau of Housing Management 
 
Source: Reform Scheme of Baoji Municipal Government (Baojishi jigou gaige fangan), June 2001.  
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Appendix 3 Background Information on Jintai and Weibin from 1998-2002 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Jintai  252,211 257,102 261,998 268,155 270,879 
Weibin  301,749 307,073 317,816 326,867 333,014 
 
 1998-2002 
Jintai  72.16 
Weibin  483 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Jintai  11,111 / / 14,320 15,357 
Weibin  11,665 12,701 13,462 15,541 16,816 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Jintai  5314/5170 5358/5751 5542/6650 5892/8455 6470/8938 
Weibin  8358/6164 8552/7163 8663/8831 8289/9716 8121/10793 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Jintai  2458 2661 2821 2905 3016 
Weibin  2208 2237 2390 2491 2594 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Baoji Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2002 and Baoji Local Chronicles Office, 





















1. The General Office of Government  
(Foreign Affairs Office and Inspection Office) 
2. Civil Affairs Bureau (League of Overseas Chinese) 
3. Planning and Economy Bureau 
 (System Reform Office, Economic Cooperation Office and 
Information Centre) 
4. Urban Planning Bureau  
5. Township Enterprise Management Bureau  
(Township Enterprises Service Committee) 
6. Prices Bureau 
7. Bureau of Land Management  
(Land Price Appraising Committee, Land Expropriation Office and 
Land Management Committee) 
8. Commerce and Trade Bureau 
9. Culture and Education Bureau (Sports Science Committee) 
10. Finance Bureau 
 (National Property Management Bureau and Agriculture Tax 
Bureau)  
11. Weibin Branch of Baoji City Police Bureau 
12. Judicial Bureau                              
13. Personnel and Labour Bureau  
(Office of Staffing Quota Commission, Target Responsibility 
Office and Health Care Centre)  
14. Agriculture Bureau (Forestry Bureau) 
15. Science and Technology Bureau   
(Science and Technology Organization)     
16. Public Health Bureau (Patriotic Public Health Committee) 
17. Family Planning Bureau  
(Family Planning Organization and Floating Population Office)          
18. Auditing Bureau 
19. Bureau of Statistics (Agriculture Investigation Team) 
20. Grain Bureau                   21. Supervising Bureau               
14 functional 
units 
1. Bureau of Environmental Protection   2. Office of Civilization 
3. Office of Dongwan             4. Office of Administrative Affairs 
5. Office of House Reform     6. Office of Tourism 
7. Bureau of Non-public Ownership Economy Development  
8. Office of Old Mans             9. People Aerial Defense Office 
10. Office of Industry             11. Bureau of Complaint  
12. Bureau of Broadcast and Television 
13. Disabled Persons’ Federation    
14. Office of Experimental Zone Management  
6 townships/ 





5 street offices Jing’er Road, Jinling, Qiaonan, Jiangtan and Qingjiang 
 
Source: “The Structure of Weibin District Government,” (accessed on in 17 December 2004), 




















1. The General Office of Government       
2. Bureau of Urban Planning 
3. Development and Planning Bureau  
(Prices Bureau and Investment Promotion Bureau) 
4. Economy and Commerce Bureau  
(Safe Production Surveillance Bureau, Township Enterprise 
Management Bureau and System Reform Office) 
5. Civil Affairs Bureau                    
6. Supervising Bureau 
7. Jintai Branch of Baoji City Police Bureau 
8. Judicial Bureau                              
9. Finance Bureau 
10. Personnel, Labour and Social Security Bureau 
11. Land and Resources Bureau        
12. Agriculture Bureau 
13. Forestry and Water Resources Bureau   
14. Education Bureau 
15. Science and Technology Bureau  
(Association for Science and Technology)      
16. Culture and Tourism Bureau         
17. Public Health Bureau 
18. Family Planning Bureau                
19. Auditing Bureau 
20. Environmental Protection Bureau    
21. Bureau of Statistics 
22. Grain Bureau                                  
23. Complaint Bureau 
24. People Aerial Defence Office, Committee of National 
















7 street offices 
 
Zhongshan East Road, Zhongshan West Road, Qunzhong Road, 
Xiguan, Dianzijie, Dongfenglu and Shilipu 
 
 











Appendix 6 The System for Evaluating Government Effectiveness in Baoji 
Municipal Government in 2002 
 
 Score Contents / Scores Marking rules 
Functional 
targets 700 
1. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) / 30  
    Annual growth rate of GDP / 70 
2. Total amount of local fiscal revenues / 80 
    Annual growth rate of local fiscal revenues / 100 
3. Total amount of fixed asset investment / 30 
    Annual growth rate of fixed asset investment / 70 
4. Annual growth rate of stockbreeding production 
value / 40 
    Average annual income of peasants / 40 
5. Total amount of investment signed in the agreement  
/ 40 
    Total amount of investment transferred and 
confirmed/ 60 
6. Total amount of taxes contributed by non-public 
ownership companies / 30 
    Growth rate of total amount of taxes contributed by 
non-public ownership companies / 30 
7. Annual output number of labour / 15 
    The number of allocation of labour in urban areas / 
15 
8. Total number of income from tourism / 25 
    Total number of people traveling in local areas / 25     
1. During 80%-
99% of degree of 
target 
achievement, full 
score is given out. 
2. Below 80% of 
degree of target 
achievement, zero 
is given. 
3. If the degree of 
achievement 
exceeds each one 
percent, 1% of 
score will be 
added. The 
maximum score 
added is 20% of 




1. Work ethics, work principles and contemporary 
tasks passed by municipal government 
2. Party construction, building of socialist spiritual 
civilization, comprehensive management of social 
order, complaint management, safety production, 
environment management, reconstruction of damaged 
classrooms and family planning 
3. Daily work management  
1. If no problems 
happened, full 
score would be 
given. 




will be deducted. 
Appraisals  100 Appraisals from city leaders by the way of questionnaires and democratic appraisal 
Any 
dissatisfaction is 
given, scores will 
be deducted.  
Others  
For districts or counties assuming some of 50 
important construction projects of city, 15 scores will 
be added if one project achieved, or else, 15 scores 
will be deducted. 
2. For districts or counties reported industrialization 
construction projects, 10 scores will be added if one 
project achieved, or else, 10 scores will be deducted.  
 
 
   Source: Contents complied from Baojishi xinanqu mubiao guanli zerenzhi kaohe zanxing banfa 
(Temporary regulations on evaluation of target management responsibility of districts and counties in 
Baoji City) (2003). 
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Appendix 7 Statistics of Civil Servants in Jintai District, December 2002  
 


































642 387 255 60 75 80 55 60 60 30 48 44 167 123 5 
 








Appendix 8 Statistics of Civil Servants in Weibin District, December 2002 
 
The number of civil servants Distribution of age among full-time staffs Distribution of education among full-time staffs 
Full-time staffs 

































 453 118 334 33 51 88 87 91 69 34 53 70 207 115 8 
 
Source: Personnel Bureau of Weibin District Government, Statistics of Civil Servants in Weibin District, 2002. 
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